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When a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to exclude minori-
ties from a jury, the United States Supreme Court has required defend-
ants to show a pattern of such exclusion to prove an equal protection
violation. This requirement is difficult to meet and may not adequately
protect the defendant's interest in an impartial jury. Professor Massaro
suggests that the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges
should be analyzed not under the equal protection clause but under the
sixth amendment. She explores the history of the jury and the interests
protected by the right to a jury-those of the defendant, the government,
and the community. Within this framework Professor Massaro isolates
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three requirements critical to the sixth amendment guarantee of a jury
trial: The jury must be impartial, drawn from a cross-section of the
community, and composed of at least some of the defendant's peers. She
proposes a procedure to prevent the prosecutor from depriving the de-
fendant of a jury meeting these three requirements-elimination of the
prosecutor's right to peremptory challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court this term will address the issue whether a
prosecutor may exercise peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from a
criminal jury.I The decision to grant certiorari in the pending case signals the
Court's first reexamination of its controversial ruling in Swain v. Alabama,2 ren-
dered twenty years ago.
Swain was a black man accused of raping a white woman. An all-white
jury in Alabama convicted Swain and sentenced him to death.3 Relying on the
equal protection clause,4 Swain challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude all black people from the petit jury. The Supreme Court
held that the equal protection clause does not bar a prosecutor from using per-
emptories to strike black people from the jury, absent a pattern of such exclusion
in several cases.5 Criminal defendants since Swain have been nearly uniformly
unsuccessful in meeting this high standard of proof in challenging the alleged
discriminatory exercise of peremptories. 6
Swain has been criticized widely and vigorously.7 Some state courts8 and
1. Batson v. Kentucky, cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2111 (1985). Batson is a short, unpublished
opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court that discusses the issue in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), in one paragraph. Batson, slip op. at 4-5 (Ky. 1984). The court summarily rejected defend-
ant's argument that the prosecutor cannot exercise peremptories to exclude all blacks from the jury,
relying on an earlier Kentucky Supreme Court opinion, Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d
924 (Ky. 1984), which announced the court's intention to adhere to Swain despite contrary develop-
ments in other states.
The United States Supreme Court in 1983 refused to hear a New York case that raised the
Swain issue, McCray v. New York, cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983), deferring to the urgings of
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell that the states be left to "serve as laboratories in which the
issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court." Id. at 2439. Justices Brennan and
Marshall disagreed with this approach and would have granted certiorari to reexamine Swain in
light of subsequent developments. Id. at 2439-43.
2. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
3. Id. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
4. The equal protection clause states: "No State shall make or enforce any law that shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XLV, § 1.
5. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24, 226-27.
6. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120-22 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing difficulties de-
fendants have experienced in meeting the Swain standard of proof).
7. An incomplete list of the articles criticizing the abuse of peremptories and the Supreme
Court's tolerance of that abuse includes Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to
an Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1978); Brown, McGuire & Winters, The
Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14
NEw ENc. L. REv. 192 (1978) (advocating abolition of peremptories for prosecution absent other
steps to prevent abusive exclusion of minorities from juries); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next
Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 289 (1968); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the
Community, 20 HASTINGs L.J 1417 (1969); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional
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two federal circuits9 have rejected the Court's parsimonious reading of a defend-
ant's right to a fair jury in a criminal trial and have resorted to the sixth amend-
ment,10 federal policy, 1 or state constitutions 12 to provide greater protection
against discriminatory exercise of peremptories. These decisions have been
praised by some 13 and condemned by others.
14
This Article argues that the Supreme Court has employed an incorrect the-
ory in analyzing defendant challenges of prosecutorial use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude minorities. The relevant constitutional text is not the equal
protection clause, but the sixth amendment, which provides the right to an im-
partial jury.15 The Article defines the sixth amendment text by plumbing three
terms commonly used to describe a fair jury: "impartial," "cross-section of the
Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966); NOTE, Peremptory
Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MIss. L.J. 157, 159-
60 (1967); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge" Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86
YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge]; Note, Fair
Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965); Recent Development, Racial Discrimination in
Jury Selection-Limiting the Prosecutor's Right of Peremptory Challenge to Prevent a Systematic
Exclusion of Blacks from Criminal Trial Juries, 41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977) (advocating use of sixth
amendment analysis to require government either to show that peremptory was not exercised be-
cause of defendant's race or to articulate a nonracial reason for exercise of peremptory challenge of
black venirepersons).
8. See, eg., People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984) (en banc);
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1984); Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Soares,
377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d
87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). Other courts have been more reluctant to abandon the Swain ration-
ale. See, eg., Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457
N.E.2d 1202 (1983); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M.
486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1982); State v. Thomp-
son, 276 S.C. 616, 281 S.E.2d 216 (1981).
9. United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, reh'g granted, 761 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1985); McCray
v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
10. See, eg., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
11. See, eg., United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, reh'g granted, 761 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1985).
12. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State
v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
13. See, eg., Note, Peremptory Challenges in Transition, 5 PAcE L. REv. 185, 198-210 (1984);
Comment, People v. Wheeler: California's Answer to Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1979).
14. The decisions in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1978), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979), two cases that reject the Supreme Court's reading of the right to a fair jury, in particular,
have drawn a lot of criticism. See, eg., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 366-74 (1982) (arguing
Wheeler and Soares are wrongly decided, unworkable, and may work to disadvantage defendants in
some cases); Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, JUDGES' J., Winter 1982, at 27 (stating
Wheeler and Soares provide the right answer for the wrong reason); Note, The Defendant's Right to
Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770 (1979) (favoring
regulation of peremptories, but arguing that Wheeler and Soares use the wrong theory to support
their commendable results); Case Comment, A New Standard for Peremptory Challenges: People v.
Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REV. 189, 196-98 (1979) (discussing problems with Wheeler approach to
peremptories).
15. The fifth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
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community," and "peers." These key terms represent distinct, sometimes con-
tradictory values that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize fully or to rec-
oncile. In particular, the Court has ignored the meaning and values represented
by the term "peer." Yet history, constitutional theory, and nonlegal sources
indicate that the presence of some jurors able to identify with the defendant-
peers-is inherent in the concept of a fair jury.
As an outgrowth of its doctrinal and semantic conclusions about the fair
jury, this Article proposes a modest change in jury selection procedure. Specifi-
cally, it advocates abolishing the government's peremptory challenges. This lim-
ited reform will prevent the government from defeating the accused's interest in
having a jury of peers, although it will not guarantee that peers will be included
in every petit jury. More extensive reforms of jury selection procedures may be
warranted and desirable, but such reforms must await a shift in judicial attitude
toward greater protection of criminal defendants' rights. When that shift oc-
curs, the conceptual framework adopted herein should provide a useful founda-
tion for more ambitious procedural innovations.
II. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The general nature of the right to trial by jury provides a backdrop for
discussing the specific issue of peremptory challenges. The history of the jury
trial, the values the jury trial advances, and the traditional conception of a fair
jury are the specifies of this backdrop.
The history of the jury is murky and variable, rendering the past an uncer-
tain guide to specific, modem jury procedures. That history, however, confirms
that the American colonists prized the right to trial by jury as a bulwark against
government oppression and that they viewed the local and lay characteristics of
the jury as keys to its effectiveness.
The jury is commonly said to protect several important values. These val-
ues include the promotion of government-, community-, and defendant-centered
interests. Paramount among these interests are those that benefit the accused.
The visual images of a fair jury depend on whether the perspective is that of the
government, the community, or the defendant. What a jury "looks like" to the
community will affect the community's respect for the verdict. Accordingly,
jury selection procedures must produce juries that appear "fair."
A. A Glance at History
Seeking historical answers to what constitutes proper jury selection proce-
dures is a confounding process. The recorded history of the jury is ambiguous,
sometimes incomplete, and often conflicting. The role and form of the jury have
changed significantly over time. Thus, a modern writer seeking to support a
particular view of the role of the jury or jury procedure usually can find some
history to support that view, although other history would contradict it.16
16. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 2-3 (1983).
Not only can the reader of history interpret that history in a way that satisfies his or her pur-
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The chameleon-like nature of the history of juries can be demonstrated
through an examination of the phrase "a jury of one's peers." The phrase, often
used to describe the right to jury trial, is traceable to the Magna Carta. It con-
jures up images of common people protected from arbitrary governnent author-
ity by popular judgments. Historians have shown, however, that the phrase in
the Magna Carta referring to peers 17-judicium parium-did not refer to a jury
as we know it.18 The barons at Runnymede wanted to ensure that when the
king assumed a cause against them they would be tried by their associates, called
sectatores, and not by judges appointed by the king. 19 The king's judges tended
to be ecclesiastics, who were not peers of the barons. The original "jury of one's
peers," therefore, was a special right of an elite social class, not a guarantee of
rights to the common people. The jury of peers transformed over time into a
right enjoyed by all citizens, not just the elite. Nevertheless, the original purpose
of having the judgment of one's peers was to protect the wealthy and powerful
from judgments by people below their social class.20
A jury trial is regarded by many people as a right that emerged to prevent
the arbitrary exercise of power by the government. Early history, however, sug-
gests a purely practical explanation for the development of the jury method of
proof.2 1 A form of criminal jury, called a presenting jury, predated the Magna
Carta and replaced other methods of proof, such as the ordeal, after 1215.22
poses, but the chronicler of history may record history in a way that conforms to his or her views
about the jury. As Jerome Frank has observed, "The historian 'imagines the past.' His picture of
the past is a 'web of imaginative construction stretched between certain fixed points' provided by his
critical judgment of his witnesses' testimony. Here, obviously, subjectivity enters." J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 38-39 (1949) (quoting R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 138 (1946)).
A complete history of the jury is beyond the scope of this Article. Credible sources of in-depth
treatment of the jury trial's history include the following: 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*349-55; F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
A STUDY IN CONSTrrUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1951); M. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM (1894); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 615-32 (2d ed. 1959).
17. The Magna Carta provides in relevant part: "No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or
dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit
him to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land." MAGNA
CHARTA REGIS JOHANNIS, XXXIX, 29 (1215).
18. See, e.g., Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, 58 AM. L. REv. 24,25-30 (1924); Hatcher,
Magna Carta and the Jury System, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 1-2, 6 (1935).
19. See, eg., W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 108-14 (1852); M. LESSER, supra note
16, at 163-64; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 173 n.3; A. SHAUFELBERGER,
BLACKS AND THE TRIAL BY JURY 50 (1973); Clark, supra note 18, at 29; Hatcher, supra note 18, at
1-13.
20. See Clark, supra note 18, at 26.
21. A jury of some form-that is, citizens chosen to decide guilt or innocence-predates the
thirteenth century. Some scholars say that the earliest ancestor of the jury lies in the Frankish
jury-the inquisitio of Charlemagne. L. MOORE, THE JURY 13-19 (1973). The citizen jury appears
in ancient Greek literature, however, suggesting a much older history. For example, Aeschylus, who
died circa 456 B.C., described a citizen tribunal in his play Eumenides, the story of Orestes. Orestes
killed his mother Clytemnestra after she murdered Agamemnon. Three demigods, known collec-
tively as the Eumenides or Furies, would give Orestes no rest. Orestes sought refuge in Athens,
where Pallas Athena called together twelve citizens of Athens to try Orestes for matricide. See also
M. LESSER, supra note 16, at 22-28 (describing the dikastery of ancient Greece, a proceeding
whereby citizens were paid to perform quasi-judicial functions, which Lesser calls "the first institu-
tion known to history which presents characteristic features of jury trial").
22. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1-2 (1982).
1986)
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The reason the jury method of proof was eventually substituted for these other
methods is unclear. One scholar reports that when the Fourth Lateran Council
in 1215 forbade clerical participation in the ordeal, the ordeal lost its power as a
judgment of God and so fell into disuse.23 The jury alternative was chosen to fill
the procedural void because by 1215 these juries had developed the power to
issue opinions that approximated verdicts on guilt or innocence.2 4 Thus, the
jury was a logical and available replacement that, with minor modification, be-
came an adequate method of proof.25 Nothing in this early history, however,
suggests that the jury method of proof was selected because it was seen as a
"palladium of liberty" or as the grand bulwark of every Englishman's liberties.26
Trial by jury was mothered not by notions of liberty but by practical necessity.27
Most of the important characteristics of the jury trial, such as selection
procedures or jury size, have changed significantly over time.28 A commonly
cited example of this transformation is that originally jurors were not disquali-
fied for their knowledge about the crime; rather, they served as witnesses of
sorts.2 9 Today, jurors ideally have little specific knowledge of the crime or the
defendant.
Under early procedure the defendant was required to consent to trial by
jury.30 The alternative to consent was "strong and hard" imprisonment-peine
forte et dure.31 The modem rule allows the defendant to waive a jury trial,
although often subject to approval by the prosecution or the court. 32 Obviously,
the modem defendant who prefers a bench trial is not imprisoned or otherwise
punished until he or she agrees to trial by jury.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 1-2. The Grand Assize, or the Assize of Clarendon of 1166 A.D., provided for a jury.
Moore describes this early jury as follows:
Both parties had a right to be present at the election [of the jurors] and challenge for good
cause members of the proposed jury. . . . If it developed that the jurors testified under
oath that they were unacquainted with the facts, other jurors were summoned until there
were 12 who had knowledge and who agreed. Knowledge did not mean first-hand knowl-
edge, but declarations of a juror's father or other equally reliable sources were sufficient.
The jurors of this court were knights, and their decision was conclusive of the dispute.
L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 39. Until the middle of the fourteenth century, members of the accus-
ing jury were allowed to serve on the trial panel. Id. at 56. A later statute prevented indictors from
remaining on the panel if the defendant objected. Id.
25. Groot, supra note 22, at 1-2.
26. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 348. Forsyth maintains that the jury was created for
administrative reasons, specifically as a means of extending the power of the king. W. FORSYTH,
supra note 19, at 137-38.
27. See, eg., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 348.
28. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 16, at 2-3 ("Surprisingly few
guidelines are available from historical and constitutional sources to resolve such basic questions as,
'How large should the jury be?' 'How much agreement must exist to render a verdict?' 'How shall
the performance of juries be evaluated?' ").
29. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 622-23. Pollock and Maitland note
that the common assertion that jurors were witnesses "does not quite hit the truth." Id. at 627.
30. L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 53.
31. Id. at 54. Peineforte et dure meant that the nonconsenting defendant was forced to bear
heavy irons and to drink only standing water. Id. at 55. Peineforte et dure was not abolished until
1772. Id. at 67.
32. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-37 (1965).
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These two examples of changes in the role and the form of jury trial
throughout English history help explain the difficulty American jurists and
scholars experience in interpreting the sixth amendment right which grew out of
that evolution.3 3 Modem interpretation problems are compounded by the many
variations regarding jury trial procedures that existed in the colonies before the
Constitution became effective, by the sixth amendment's silence regarding which
of the common-law requisites of the jury were to be preserved, and by the ongo-
ing changes in jury practice since the Constitution was adopted. 34
At least one thing is clear from American history-the right to trial by jury
was an interest of great importance to the colonists. Various forms of that right
were included in King James I's Instructions for the Government of the Colony
of Virginia drafted in 1606, 35 the Massachusetts Body of Liberties adopted in
1641,36 the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey of 1677,37 the
Frame of Government of Pennsylvania of 1682,38 the Declaration of Rights of
the First Continental Congress of 1774,39 the Constitution of Virginia of 1776,40
33. As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 143 (1936):
These requirements [of the sixth amendment] are all of first importance. But it would
hardly be contended that in all these matters regard must be had to the particular forms
and procedure used at common law. These requirements relate to matters of substance and
not of form. And the true purpose of the Amendment can be achieved only by applying
them in that sense.
Of course, it is difficult to separate substance from form when the right at stake is procedural. The
form of the procedure is, in effect, the right. Flexibility must be allowed, however, to accommodate
growth and change so that the procedure continues to respond to modem needs. Thus it becomes a
sensitive matter of judgment as to which "forms" are nonessential to the fundamental character of
the "right" and therefore may be abandoned without unduly compromising the right.
34. The Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty in interpreting the sixth amendment in
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972):
[A]fter a proposal had been made to specify precisely which of the common-law requisites
of the jury were to be preserved by the Constitution, the Framers explicitly rejected the
proposal and instead left such specification to the future. . . . [O]ur inability to divine
"the intent of the Framers" when they eliminated references to the "accustomed requi-
sites" requires that in determining what is meant by a jury we must turn to other than
purely historical considerations.
Our inquiry must focus upon the function served by the jury in contemporary society.
Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
35. L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 97. The First Charter of Virginia provided that all subjects in
the colonies should "have and enjoy all Liberties. . .as if they had been abidding and born, within
this our realm of England," including the right to trial by jury, which was mentioned specifically in
King James I's Instructions for the Government of the Colony of Virginia. Id. (quoting THE FIRST
CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (1606)).
36. Id.; A. SHAUFELBERGER, supra note 19, at 59 (guaranteeing that the liberty "to choose
whether they will be tryed by the Bench or by a Jurie. . .shall be granted to all persons in Criminal
cases").
37. L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 98-99 (quoting the CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF
WEST NEW JERSEY, ch. XVII (1677), guaranteeing "a due tryal, and judgment passed by twelve,
good and lawful men of his neighbourhood").
38. Id. at 99 (quoting the FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1682), which guaran-
teed that "all trials shall be by twelve men, and as near as may be, peers or equals, and of the
neighborhood").
39. Id. at 101 (quoting the DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
OF 1774, which stated: "[T"he respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and
more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peer; of the vincinage
according to the course of law.").
40. Id. at 101-02 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, which provided for a defendant's right "to a
19861
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the Declaration of Independence, 41 and the first constitutions of most states.42
The principal reason the colonists so prized the right to jury trial apparently was
their belief that layperson juries would prevent arbitrary exercise of government
authority.4 3 Their precise reasoning can only be inferred from their expansive
rhetoric about the right, including their proclamations of the jury as "a valuable
safeguard to liberty" and as "the palladium of free government." 44 The colo-
nists' faith in the virtue of trial by jury culminated in the adoption of the sixth
amendment to the Constitution in 1789. 45
The general language of the sixth amendment, however, reflects a compro-
mise designed to preserve local customs.4 6 For example, many colonists re-
garded the practice of limiting the vicinity from which jurors could be drawn as
critical to the goal of preventing arbitrary exercise of government power. The
terms "neighborhood" and "vicinage" figured prominently in early discussion
about the proper geography for fair jury selection.47 The sixth amendment's
compromise language-that the accused "shall enjoy the right to. . . an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law"48-preserves the
local flavor of the jury, although it is less parochial and intimate than the earlier
references to "neighborhood" and "vicinage. '" 4 9 This quoted language is the
only direction the Constitution offers for how the jury should be selected.
The generality of the sixth amendment in defining the form of the jury has
produced confusion about what procedures are included in the sixth amendment
mandate. The result of this confusion is a fluid body of law under which the
American jury has undergone significant changes since 1789. One example of
these changes is the attitude toward the jury as a body designed to decide ques-
tions of both fact and law. Juries in some jurisdictions once enjoyed the legal
right (versus the implicit flexibility) to disregard the court's instructions about
speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he
cannot be found guilty,. . . that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or
the judgment of his peers").
41. Id. at 102. Moore notes that the Declaration of Independence was "brief but to the point"
in declaring that one reason for the separation from England was " '[flor depriving us, in many
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.'" Id. (quoting the Declaration of Independence).
42. Id. at 102-04.
43. See F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 22-25; L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 102-05.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-22 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
45. See F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 27-34.
46. Heller notes that the jury trial of colonial days varied among the colonies. Thus, in order to
preserve local customs, only a general statement about the jury could be included in the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 15; see also A. SHAUFELBERGER, supra note 19, at 59-62 (listing laws of the 1600s and
1700s that mentioned trial by jury).
47. F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 21-22, 25-26; see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1969).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 25-27; see also supra notes 35-40 (quoting colonial documents
guaranteeing the right to trial by jury). Heller reports that the colonists were badly divided as to the
definition of a proper locality for juries. After some struggle, the geographical limit of"the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed" was approved. F. HELLER, supra note 16, at
31-33 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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the law.50 This right corresponded with America's boundless enthusiasm for
juries and opposition to professional lawyers during the eighteenth century.51
Over time, however, enthusiasm for the jury waned and the jury's right to decide
law was emasculated.5 2 The decline of the jury as an arbiter of law probably
reflected a decline in people's trust in the common person and a shift in legal
philosophy from a natural law to a positive law theory.5 3 Today, jurors in
nearly every jurisdiction are instructed to follow the law as the judge recites it,
although they may not always do so.54
There are other examples of important procedural changes in the American
jury. Juries of six instead of twelve have been approved as constitutional,55 and
rules regarding whether judges or lawyers conduct voir dire have varied.5 6 The
composition of jury pools has changed considerably. Until fairly recent times,
women rarely served as jurors. Originally, they were excluded from the jury
altogether;57 later, the rules in many states automatically excluded women who
did not "opt in" to the jury pool.58 The laws prohibiting black people from
serving as jurors also have changed, progressing from exclusion of all black peo-
ple5 9 to inclusion of black men60 to inclusion of both black men and women.
Even today, however, a disproportionate number of black persons are either not
called to serve on juries or are excused peremptorily. 61 Originally, property
ownership was a precondition to service as a juror.62 Although wealth is no
longer an express condition of jury qualification, economic factors continue to
play an indirect role in determining who serves on juries. Jury pools often in-
clude only those on voting rolls or those able to afford telephones, and lawyers
frequently exercise their challenges during jury selection in ways that produce
middle class juries.63
50. See L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 107-13, 150-51; Howe, Juries as Judger of Criminal Law,
52 HARV. L. REv. 582, 583-96 (1939).
51. F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 15; Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 178-79, 182 (1964).
52. Note, supra note 51, at 173.
53. See Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 403
(1954); Note, supra note 51, at 171.
54. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 225-26 (1977).
55. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970).
56. See infra note 136.
57. See, eg., L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 131-32. The Supreme Court stated in Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880), that the exclusion of women was constitutional. This
position was not officially renounced until 1975 when the "opt-in" method of selecting women jurors
was held unconstitutional. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
58. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
59. See, eg., Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM
IN AMERICA 23, 25 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
60. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
61. See, eg., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (at the time of Swain's trial, no black
person had ever served on a jury in Talladega County because prosecutor used peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude them).
62. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 13-14.
63. See, eg., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 62-65; Comment, Underrepresentation of Eco-
nomic Groups on Federal Juries, 57 B.U.L. REv. 198, 200 (1977). Other types of discrimination
occur as well, although the courts generally have been unreceptive to challenges to juries on these
bases. See, eg., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (economic status); United States v. Guzman,
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These are only a handful of examples of the dynamic character of the crimi-
nal jury in America. The purpose in presenting this cursory history is not to
prove that a particular feature of the jury did or did not exist in the past but to
illustrate that the form of the jury has varied. Accordingly, the problem of
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges cannot be solved by reference
to history.
Despite its many metamorphoses, the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury is not wholly elastic or subject to whatever procedural modifications the
Supreme Court deems expedient. As in other areas of constitutional law, the
absence of specific history to direct the Supreme Court in construing the amend-
ment is neither an invitation to eviscerate individual rights nor a license to in-
vent them. The Court must identify and preserve the basic values the sixth
amendment represents through a proper balance of discretion and vision. To
effect this balance, the Court must decide what interests the lay jury fosters and
what procedures best protect those interests.
B. The Interests That Underlie the Right to Trial by Jury
As noted above, trial by jury did not begin as a safeguard of popular input
into the criminal justice system but as an acceptable means of resolving contro-
versies after older methods of proof fell into disfavor. By the time trial by jury
migrated to the United States, however, the jury was perceived as the "palla-
dium of free government"" and was a right secured to all citizens, at least in
theory if not in practice. 65 The modem American jury thus serves a very differ-
ent function from the function served by its ancient English predecessor.
The modem jury serves a fact-finding function, but this description fails to
explain the jury's significance. If fact finding were the dominant reason for hav-
ing juries, jury trials would have been abolished or would have become the ex-
clusive means of finding facts. Three centuries of using juries in this country
probably would have shown either that American judges can find facts better
than American juries or that juries are better fact finders than judges and so
should be the preferred method of trial in all criminal cases. 66 Given the lower
468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972) (age); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972) (age);
United States v. James, 453 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1971) (economic status and occupation); United States
v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971) (economic status and occupation); United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (age). But see Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946)
(automatic exclusion of daily wage earners held improper).
64. See eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 44, at 521-22.
65. Hyman and Tarrant described the importance the colonists ascribed to the jury right as
follows:
To a surprising extent, colonial Americans perceived and acted on a common principle:
that every accused person-white person, at least-had a right to a jury trial, which ade-
quately protected him while he was before the law. In this manner, juries helped substan-
tially to link "nationally" the colonies with individuals. Considering the imperial expanses
of the American land, the lack of other connectives such as an established church (except
in Virginia and in a few counties of New York and New Jersey), and the multiplicity of
ethnic ancestries, races, and languages of the inhabitants, this was no mean contribution.
Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 59, at 24.
66. See J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 126.
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cost and time of a bench trial versus a jury trial, a tie would go to the judges. In
the context of criminal juries, however, few seriously urge the abolition of jury
trials. 67 Although inertia could explain this quiescence, the more plausible ex-
planation is that juries are believed to serve interests beyond effective fact
finding.
The several interests the jury is said to protect are essentially defendant-
centered, community-centered, and government-centered. One defendant-
centered interest is the interposition of the common sense judgment of laypeople
between the accused and the accuser. 68 This common sense judgment may pro-
tect the defendant from an abuse of power by government officials. As the
Supreme Court has said, the jury provides a "safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 69
The defendant's interest in being heard is protected by the number of voices
on the jury. The input of several voices may reduce the possibility of an unfair,
short-sighted, or erroneous decision.70 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
the interest served by numbers, observing that participation by twelve laypeople
can produce a "diffused impartiality."'7 1 The need for diffused impartiality
stems from the heterogeneity of society, and hence of perceptions, and from the
realization that no person is really "impartial. ' 72 Theoretically, a fact-finding
process conducted by a number of persons is more likely to discover the "truth"
than a process conducted by one person. If this theoretical underpinning is cor-
rect, the jury is especially valuable in the criminal case, because decisions about
guilt or innocence reflect subjective value judgments that have tremendous im-
67. Nevertheless, the value of the jury may be overestimated if one agrees with Justice Cardozo
that the right to trial by jury is "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). In his view, "few would be so narrow or provincial as to
maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without [the jury]." Id.
The Supreme Court no longer accepts this view. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968),
the Court held that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to American justice and thus is
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
68. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
100 (1970).
69. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see Preface to NATIONAL JURY PROJECT,
INC., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES at x (2d ed. 1985) ("The jury is the one institution in
the American criminal justice system which stands between the people and abuse of authority by the
state.").
70. The preference for laypersons' judgments may also stem from a distrust of, or disinclination
to rely exclusively on, lawyers' and judges' judgments. As one of George Eliot's characters in Mid-
dlemarch observes, "In my opinion . . ., legal training only makes a man more incompetent in
questions that require knowledge of another kind." G. ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH 168 (The Folio Soci-
ety, London 1972), quoted in L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 164.
71. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
72. In terms equally applicable to the American jury, a commentator on the English system has
observed:
[What individual can so well weigh conflicting evidence, as twelve men indifferently cho-
sen from the middle classes of the community, of various habits, characters, prejudices and
ability? The number and variety of the persons is eminently calculated to secure a sound
conclusion upon the opposing evidence of witnesses or of circumstance.
Speech by Lord Brougham, House of Commons (Feb. 7, 1828), quoted in M. LESSER, supra note 16,
at 223-24.
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plications for the accused. 73
Popular participation in criminal trials also serves community interests. Ju-
rors are drawn from a limited geographical vicinity. Juries therefore satisfy the
community's desire to participate in, and consequently to effect some control
over, the criminal justice system. The jury interjects community conscience into
the process, if only symbolically.74 Community participation in turn enhances
public confidence in and willingness to accept trial determinations. 7
Another possible advantage of popular participation is that untrained fact
finders are not compelled to give reasons for their verdicts. Juries thus can in-
troduce into the law a flexibility and responsiveness to special circumstances that
may be important to its public acceptance.7 6 Legal principles sometimes dictate
a particular decision in circumstances in which popular sentiment would con-
demn that result. In this situation jurors can, and sometimes do, refuse to follow
the law without providing an explanation. 77
Some people praise the jury's power to nullify statutory law and acquit a
defendant it deems not blameworthy;78 others condemn the jury's use of such
73. The need for a diffused impartiality on essentially subjective questions as a reason for the
jury in criminal cases may be overstated. Other, noncriminal cases likewise entail subjective assess-
ments that have vast implications for the participants, yet no jury right applies to these cases. For
example, no jury right attaches to child custody suits. See L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 163.
74. See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 21 (1984) ("In a sense, the jury achieves symbolically
what cannot be achieved practically-the presence of the entire populace at every trial."); Comment,
The Prohibition of Group Based Stereotypes in Jury Selection Procedures, 25 VILL. L. REv. 339, 345
(1979-80) ("Among the various purposes which the jury serves is that it grants legitimacy to soci-
ety's perception of the jury as the collective conscience of the community."); Note, supra note 14, at
1782 ("[The jury] serves as a surrogate for the individual judgment of [the public's] citizens."). The
locale from which the jurors are selected affects the extent to which the jury's verdict is regarded as a
reflection of community sentiment. Because the jury pool is limited to a geographical area near the
place of trial, the jury represents "close-to-home, law-and-order principles and practices that helped
greatly to create a spirit of American nationality." Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 59, at 30. The
locale of the jury pool thus was an issue critical to the colonists in their debates about the sixth
amendment.
75. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law . . . is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is
also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."); see also A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (H. Reeve trans. Galaxy ed. 1946). Tocqueville
wrote:
The jury. . . serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens;
and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institu-
tions. It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged, and with the notion of right.
Id.
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 83 that to examine whether the jury is useful
or essential in a representative republic would be "more curious than beneficial, as all are satisfied of
the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra
note 44, at 522.
76. P. DIPERNA, supra note 74, at 191-93.
77. A recent example of the refusal of jurors to follow the law is the case of Bernard Goetz,
who attracted nationwide attention by shooting youths who harassed him on the New York City
subway. Many people, frustrated by increasing crime and violence, favored nonprosecution of an
apparently unremorseful Goetz. The grand jury that first heard the evidence against Goetz refused
to indict him for murder. See IX Guild Notes, Spring 1985, at 1, col. 1.
78. See, eg., Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 71-74; Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). It may be that one's reaction to jury nullification depends in part on
whether one believes in principles of natural justice, or natural law, versus positive law or legal
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power.7 9 Implicit in this nullification function, and in some commentators' ap-
proval of it, may be a condonation of mercy or passion over formalism and logic.
The advocacy of occasional jury "lawlessness" may also reflect a basic, almost
primitive, desire to return the power to fashion justice to local citizens. 80
Because juries are nameless, ever-changing bodies, they can make difficult,
essentially subjective choices that would be less acceptable to the community if
made by a single judge.8 1 In this way juries may enhance public confidence in
the criminal justice system. An example is a decision of a jury in a rape case in
which the defendant claims the alleged victim consented. A consent rape case
involves complicated and subtle questions of credibility and evidence that evoke
powerful emotional reactions in many people.8 2 A judge's decision to credit
either the man's or the woman's testimony could produce a negative reaction
from a variety of different groups. Although a jury's decision might evoke simi-
lar reactions, a verdict by a jury composed of representatives of key community
groups-minority and non-minority women and men-is more likely to be ac-
ceptable to all of these groups than would one judge's ruling.
The role of the parties in selecting both the jury method of proof and the
members of the jury is another feature of a jury trial that increases community
acceptance of the verdict. Neither the parties nor the public is likely to com-
plain that a verdict is unfair when it is rendered by persons the parties have
selected. 83 This element of choice may be illusory for some defendants. Never-
realism. A natural law theory adherent may be more willing to give jurors free rein, as a layperson's
sense of justice should be as sound and consistent over time as that of a professional judge.
79. See, eg., J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 129-30; Simpson, Jury Nullification in the American
System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488, 512-20 (1976); see also Bonnie, Morality, Equality,
and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5, 10-12 (1984) (arguing that allowing juries to nullify law and to make
individual, situational assessments of a defendant's blameworthiness would lead to uneven applica-
tion of the law and thus would undermine the preventative function of criminal law).
80. The popular appeal of jury lawlessness is evidenced by the positive response to "The Ver-
dict," a movie in which the professionals depicted, lawyers and doctors, are corrupt and incompe-
tent. The hero of the film is the jury, which finds for the plaintiff, a victim of medical malpractice,
despite her incompetent legal representation and an incorrect ruling by the judge excluding the only
evidence that could support the jury's verdict. The filmmakers create the distinct impression that
jury nullification is necessary to combat corruption in the legal profession.
81. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBT, TRAGIC CHOICES 57 (1978); A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE § 72, at 93 (1971). Pollock and Maitland observe:
We shall hardly explain the shape that trial by jury very soon assumed unless we take to
heart the words of an illustrious judge of our own day:--"It saves judges from the responsi-
bility-which to many men would appear intolerably heavy and painful-of deciding sim-
ply on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner." It saved the judges
of the middle ages not only from this moral responsibility, but also from enmities and
feuds.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 627 (quoting 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMI-
NAL LAw OF ENGLAND 573 (1883)); see also Broeder, supra note 53, at 418 ("Reasoning powers are
often incapable of coping with knotty factual disputes; and to the extent jury magic can resolve
them, legal certainty can in one sense be regarded as having been enhanced."). But see J. FRANK,
supra note 16, at 136-37 (arguing that judges should be "able and willing to accept public criticism"
and already must do so in the cases they try without juries).
82. See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue
and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 402-10 (1985).
83. See L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 161; see also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
16, at 623 (describing the jury of the thirteenth century and noting that because the litigants agreed
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theless, the unfavorable verdict of a jury the parties have chosen generally will
be viewed with more equanimity than would an adverse ruling by a judge the
parties did not select.
The presence of jurors also adds to the trial a human dimension that is
difficult to measure. As Professor Tribe has said, "The jury mediate[s] between
'the law' in the abstract and the human needs of those affected by it."'84 This
humanizing function serves the community by helping the law to operate in a
way that is comprehensible to the people the law must serve. If legal theories
are too complex for jurors, who represent the nonlegal community, then the
theories must be simplified. Otherwise, the citizen who must abide by the law
will not understand what it requires and therefore may not conform to its
dictates.
The elements of drama and ritual inherent in a jury trial enhance the hu-
manizing quality of the jury. The presence of "twelve men good and true" cor-
responds with a deeply engrained sense of what a criminal trial "looks like" and
of how our society should decide questions of guilt and punishment. This rela-
tionship does not necessarily mean that the ritual of a jury trial is a good ritual
but simply that the community has come to expect and revere it.85
In addition to the defendant-centered and community-centered interests it
serves, the jury also serves several government-centered interests that are impor-
to be bound by the verdict "of the country," neither could "quarrel with the declaration that he has
invoked. He has called for it, and must accept it.").
84. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1376 (1971). Tribe describes much of what happens in a criminal trial as ceremonial or ritual-
istic expressions of "profoundly significant moral relationships and principles-principles too subtle
to be translated into anything less complex than the intricate symbolism of the trial process." Id. at
1391. He sees the trial rights of the accused not only as devices for achieving certain legal results but
also as "affirmations of respect for the accused as a human being-affirmations that remind him and
the public about the sort of society we want to become and indeed, about the society we arc." Id. at
1392. But see Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 29 (arguing that the ritualist view of the trial fails to consider that the ordinary citizen
does not participate in the ceremony and that the celebration of trust, equality, and individual dig-
nity in the judicial proceeding is done exclusively by and for the lawyers).
85. Moore credits tradition as a basis for public respect for the jury and notes, "All societies
that have endured have, consciously or otherwise, emphasized the authority of their institutions by
appealing to the antiquity of their forms." L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 145. Other writers have
acknowledged the importance of ritual in the law. Smith, McWilliams, and Bloomfield have
observed:
[A]ll social rituals and some in particular (like religious rites) have a special shape and
drama, but in few areas of life is this so obvious and important as in the law. Society wants
trials to follow their special structure not only for practical reasons of hearing cases but
also because that structure is satisfying in some profound way. This suggests that the
standards of legal order and aesthetic order are related, and that the individual's and the
community's conception of justice is based not only on principles but also on a sense of
what is the most emotionally and intellectually pleasing relation of actions.
C. SMITH, J. MCWILLIAMS & M. BLOOMFIELD, LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 15 (1983); see
also Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theatre, 28
STAN. L. REv. 81, 82 (1975) ("The live presentation of cases in the courtroom, although a means to
the end of judgment, is also an end in itself. Trials and oral argument are as essential to the judicial
system as performance is to drama.").
Frank acknowledges the part tradition plays in preserving the jury, but does so to criticize thejury. See J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 139 (arguing that "[i]t is extremely doubtful whether, if we did
not now have the jury system, we could today be persuaded to adopt it," and that it persists only
because it has "become embedded in our customs, our traditions").
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tant to a democracy. Jury duty educates citizens in the mechanics of their jus-
tice system and palpably demonstrates the responsibility of citizens for the
quality of government.8 6 The continued exposure to the legal system that law-
yers and judges experience is likely to harden them to the bewilderment, respect,
and awe that the law can evoke in laypersons. A powerful reminder of the edu-
cational aspect of jury trials is the positive reaction many citizens have to their
service as jurors.8 7 Moreover, to the extent their encounter with the justice sys-
tem increases jurors' respect for judgments, it preserves government power.88
The significance of the various functions of the jury is qualified by the
power of the defendant to waive a jury trial.8 9 Thus, although trial by jury
furthers the community interests described above, and despite the acknowledge-
ment that trial by the jury is "the preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact
in criminal cases above the grade of petty offenses," 90 the jury trial right remains
the privilege of the accused. This fact is often ignored in discussions about vari-
ous aspects of trial by jury, including the discussion about whether the prosecu-
tor should be allowed to exercise peremptories to exclude minorities from the
jury. To lose sight of the sixth amendment as a defendant-centered right, how-
ever, means to lose sight of its place in the Bill of Rights.91
86. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 166, 171 (1929).
Wigmore asserts:
In a democracy, where the operation of the law frequently becomes a political issue, it is
important that the body of citizens should have a general acquaintance with court meth-
ods. They must not be a mystery. Mere publicity of trials does not effect this; for only the
casual witnesses and the idle or curious now form the audience of a court room (except in
certain rural regions). But jury-duty will bring all respectable citizens sooner or later to
have acquaintance with court methods, and in such a way as to compel serious thought and
give the needed scrap of judiciary education common to all.
With judge-trial, nothing of the kind takes place. Even the publicity of trial does not
produce its modicum of effect; compare the attendance before a master or referee and the
attendance at the humblest jury-court.
Id.; see also Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 59, at 40 (stating that jury service educates Americans in
the areas of law and justice); cf. Broeder, supra note 53, at 419 (questioning fairness to litigants of
educating the citizenry at their expense).
87. See, e.g., E. KENNEBECK, JUROR NUMBER FOUR (1973) (account of juror in trial of thir-
teen Black Panthers); M. TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN (1975) (account of the forewoman of the jury in
the trial of Angela Davis). The positive reactions by those who have actually served as jurors should
not be confused with the reluctance of others to serve as jurors that some writers cite in contending
that jury service is perceived as an "irksome" chore. See, eg., Broeder, supra note 53, at 420 (wide-
spread attempt of persons to secure exemptions from jury service).
88. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 75, at 128 ("The jury, then, which seems to restrict the
rights of the judiciary, does in reality consolidate its power; and in no country are the judges so
powerful as where the people share their privileges."). One may argue that because the jury presents
only a very limited incursion on official authority, it preserves to government the maximum power
possible. Also, because it is viewed by many as representative of society, the jury may be a danger-
ously deceptive institution insofar as it is not, in fact, representative of those groups most powerless,
most disaffected, and as such most oppressed by government and existing hierarchies. Thus, the jury
may have enough power to placate the community but not enough to disturb the status quo in any
significant fashion. On the contrary, it may preserve the status quo far better than no community
participation would, particularly if the jurors themselves are members of the dominant middle class
culture. See Broeder, supra note 53, at 414 (arguing that the jury protects individuals from govern-
ment oppression only when the government is more powerful than the people; when the people are
more powerful, jurors may support government oppression).
89. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
90. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
91. The Supreme Court in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), approved a defendant's
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A second qualification of the discussion of the jury's functions is that many
of the assertions concerning these functions are assumed, untested, or controver-
sial. Not everyone agrees, for example, that the opinions of laypeople represent
"common sense judgments." Some would argue that jury decisions are irra-
tional and based on emotional responses to attorneys and witnesses, 92 while
others would argue that the jury represents the lowest common denominator of
society,93 that it is expensive, 94 and that it is subject to whim and prejudice. 95
Others maintain that the theory may be good but the practice is corrupt; juries
right to waive trial by jury in a felony case. In allowing waiver by a defendant, the Court identified
no distinct state or community interest in a jury trial. The only state interest the Court mentioned
was that of preventing the accused from waiving the state's interest in the individual's liberty. Id. at
295-96. The Court concluded that this interest was overcome by the improbability that a defendant
would waive his or her liberty interest and go to jail; moreover, a defendant is allowed to plead guilty
to a crime without impairing this state interest. Id.
The Court emphasized the individual-centered character of the sixth amendment in the follow-
ing passage:
The record of English and colonial jurisprudence outdating the Constitution will be
searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury in criminal cases was regarded as a part of
the structure of government, as distinguished from a right or privilege of the accused. On
the contrary, it uniformly was regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon the person
accused of crime for the purpose of safeguarding him against the oppressive power of the
King and the arbitrary or partial judgment of the court.
Id. at 296-97. In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 34 (1965), however, the Court retreated from its
view of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury as an exclusively defendant-centered privilege.
The Court in Singer upheld the criminal rule of procedure that allows the prosecution to override the
defendant's waiver of trial by jury. The Court held that a defendant has no constitutional right to a
nonjury trial; consequently, there is "no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this
right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney." Id. at 36. The only result of this condition is that
the defendant will be tried by a jury, which is the very right secured to the defendant by the sixth
amendment. The Court then added the following statement, without citation or other authority:
The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining
guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that the cases in
which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitu-
tion regards as most likely to produce a fair result. This recognition of the government's
interest as a litigant has an analogy in Rule 24(b) of the [Flederal [R]ules [of Criminal
Procedure], which permits the government to challenge jurors peremptorily.
Id. This passage is troubling; if the right to trial by jury belongs to the defendant and if the defend-
ant can waive it, then the government enjoys no constitutional interest in a jury trial. Although the
defendant has no constitutional right to not have a jury, the choice should be the defendant's. The
government cannot reasonably complain that the alternative, a bench trial, is unfair unless the bench
is biased or otherwise incompetent. If it is, then the problem is not a sixth amendment one.
The Court is correct in concluding that the defendant is neither deprived of a fair trial nor of the
right to trial by jury if he or she waives a jury but nonetheless is tried by an impartial jury. The
problem of Singer is not its result but its embrace of the notion that the state has an interest in a
particular method of trial among the available, fair methods-bench or jury-that can defeat the
defendant's preference for a bench trial. The vague "government-as-litigant" rationale for Singer is
unpersuasive and unnecessary.
92. See, eg., J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 130. Frank disputes the premise that jurors are so-
phisticated enough to selectively ignore the legal rules handed down by the judge. He argues, in-
stead, that jury decisions are based on emotion due, in part, to jurors' failure to understand thejudge's explanation of the applicable legal rules.
93. See Broeder, supra note 53, at 390-91 (typical jury selection process exempts from service
professional men and women, or those most capable of serving).
94. Id. at 423 (rebutting argument that a jury trial deters litigation and, instead, arguing that
the requirement of a jury trial causes, for the most part, congested court dockets, thus delaying
trials).
95. Id. at 412, 415 (citing numerous instances in which minorities have been convicted on very
slight evidence).
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represent only white, middle-class Americans, not the community.96 Some jury
critics would likely applaud developments in the law that allow six-person ju-
ries,97 nonunanimous verdicts,9 8 judge-conducted voir dire,9 9 and other limita-
tions on the jury designed to save time and money.
Whether the jury is the best way to resolve criminal cases, however, is irrel-
evant to decisions about proper jury composition and selection procedures. A
debate about whether juries are a good thing is essentially a debate about
whether the sixth amendment should be abolished. Because there is no move-
ment calling for such an abolition, this Article assumes that the sixth amend-
ment represents a current political consensus. Accordingly, it proceeds on the
premise that the right to trial by jury represents valuable interests, that para-
mount among these interests are those that benefit the accused, and that a
proper jury procedure is one that protects, rather than undermines, these
interests.
C. The Jury as Triptych
The negative reaction to Swain ° ° stems from the appearance of unfairness
in having a white jury hear a case in which a black defendant is accused of
raping a white woman. No discussion of Swain addresses the evidence used to
convict Mr. Swain in any detail, and for good reason: guilt of the defendant is
irrelevant to whether the jury composition appeared acceptable. 101
Because a jury's fairness is determined not only by its verdict but also by its
visual appearance, jury selection procedures must produce juries that corre-
spond to people's images of a fair jury. Otherwise, people will distrust jury ver-
dicts regardless of the "correctness" of those results on the merits, and the jury
will lose the respect essential to effective decision making.
The visual image of a fair jury can be described as a triptych. A triptych is
a picture that has three panels, side by side. The center panel image is fixed,
while the flanking panel images overlap the center panel image. In a triptych of
the criminal jury, the left panel represents the defendant's image of a fair jury-a
96. See, eg., Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L. J.
80, 80 (1973).
97. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
98. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). In 1984 two bills to permit attorney
voir dire in federal civil and criminal trials were approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts, but they have not been adopted. See Riley, Voir Dire Debate Escalates
Over Lawyers' Participation, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 3; 9 Litigation News, Summer 1984,
at 1, col. 2.
100. See supra note 7.
101. Although neither the apparent guilt of the defendant nor the heinousness of the crime
should influence a court's decision whether the trial procedure was fair, both may affect a judge's
view of the procedural objections. Thus, it is not unusual for a court that refuses to overturn a
conviction to state in detail the gruesome facts of a case. See, eg., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct.
844, 847 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Patton v. Young, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2886 (1984). Justice
Stevens has expressed concern about this phenomenon, id. at 2893-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and
has noted that the Court, in 20 consecutive cases, exercised its discretion to decide a criminal case
summarily to "ma[ke] sure that an apparently guilty defendant was not given too much protection
by the law." Id. at 2900 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
group of citizens who will listen to the defendant's version of the facts and who,
ideally, will identify in some way with the defendant's life or be empathetic to
the defendant's plight. The jury represents the defendant's hope of a hearing by
others of common experience.
The right panel represents the government's image of a fair jury-a group
of citizens who will listen to the government's version of the facts and who will
perform a role in the enforcement of the penal code by convicting defendants
whose guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. The government desires a
jury that will identify with the victims of crime and that will be not be afraid to
punish those who violate the law and injure others.
The center panel of the triptych represents the community's image of the
jury-a group of citizens who will sift through the defendant's and the govern-
ment's evidence and extract the truth. The community may identify with both
the defendant and the government, because its members may one day be victims
of crime or of government oppression. Fearing both, though perhaps not
equally, the community desires a jury system that is reasonably fair to the de-
fendant yet willing to protect the people from criminals. It probably desires a
jury composed of some-but not all-defendant empathizers and some-but not
all-victim empathizers.
If this rough concept of the jury is accurate, then a jury selection procedure
that allows both sides to challenge prospective jurors for cause and to challenge
a limited number of others for no reason through peremptories seems accepta-
ble. What should emerge from this procedure is a jury composed of some de-
fendant-empathizers and some victim-empathizers, with the extremes of either
side offset. The defendant might need to be allotted extra peremptories to coun-
terbalance the government's natural advantage in a criminal case.102 This de-
scription represents, roughly, how the system operates today, at least for
defendants who come from groups that are well-represented in the community.
The problem with the system is that not all defendants have enough em-
pathizers in the community so that at least one of them is sure to get into the
jury box after the prosecution has exercised its peremptories. This result is par-
ticularly likely when the prosecution intentionally exercises those peremptories
to eliminate the defendant's peers. When the jury contains none of the defend-
ant's peers, the defendant's hope of an empathetic hearing vanishes. The left
panel image of the jury as citizens who will hear the defendant is distorted or
even eliminated, and the center panel image of the jury becomes right-panel
skewed.
This result occurred in Swain. Swain's jury appeared unfair because none
of his peers, in this case black persons, was included. Moreover, the absence of
black jurors was attributable to government exercise of peremptories. The right
panel of the triptych of Swain's jury thus was doubly weighted in favor of the
government: it was all-white, and the prosecution made it that way. Whether
102. Some studies indicate that 60% of prospective jurors do not accept the principle that a
defendant is presumed innocent. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT & NATIONAL LAWYERS'
GUILD, THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE 2 (1975).
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the Swain result is a necessary evil in a system that is otherwise benign in ap-
pearance depends on whether reasonable alternatives to that result exist and
whether those alternatives are consistent with constitutional history and values.
III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PRACTICES
This section reviews peremptory challenge practices and history and the
significance of voir dire to the exercise of those challenges. The review demon-
strates that peremptories have never been proven to be an effective means of
eliminating bias on the jury. Rather, they serve only to comfort somewhat the
parties' attorneys about the jury's predisposition to rule against them, an interest
that has been given undue importance by the Supreme Court when conflicts
have arisen between the state's peremptories and the defendant's right to a fair
jury.
A. Peremptories
Challenges to prospective jurors are of two basic types: challenges for
cause,10 3 which are available to both sides in unlimited numbers, and peremp-
tory challenges, which are also available to both sides but in limited, sometimes
unequal, numbers. 10° These challenges occur at the end of the jury selection
103. Typical bases for cause challenges are a blood relationship between a party and the poten-
tial juror, a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, or prejudice against either party. See A.
SHAUFELBERGER, supra note 19, at 121; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 143-44.
104. In several states, the number of peremptory challenges allowed each side is determined
according to the punishment that may be imposed. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070 (West 1985)
(each side is allowed twenty-six peremptories if the potential punishment is death or imprisonment
for life, six if the offense is punishable by a maximum of ninety days in the penitentiary, and ten in all
other cases); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82g (West 1985) (each side gets twenty-five perempto-
des if the crime is punishable by death, fifteen if the crime is punishable by life imprisonment, six if
the punishment that may be imposed is imprisonment for greater than one year but less than life, and
three in all other cases); Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, § 115-4(4)(e), 1963 Ill. Laws 2836,
2868 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-(4)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1985)) (State and
defense each get twenty peremptories in a capital case, ten if the offense is punishable by imprison-
ment in the state penitentiary and five in all other cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1983) (each
side gets fourteen challenges in a capital case and six in a noncapital case; each party gets one
additional peremptory for each alternate juror); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.15 (Vernon
1966 & Supp. 1985) (each side gets fifteen peremptories in a capital case and ten in other felony
cases); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350 (State and defense are each given ten peremptories if the crime is
punishable by death or life imprisonment; each side is allowed six challenges in other felony cases);
MAss. R. CRIM. P. 20(c)(1) (State and defense each get twelve peremptories if the crime is punish-
able by life imprisonment and four in all other cases if tried before a jury of twelve, but if tried before
a jury of six, each side is entitled to two peremptory challenges).
The manner of exercising peremptory challenges is similarly varied. Several states grant the
trial court virtually unlimited discretion in determining the manner and order in which peremptory
challenges may be exercised. See, eg., Valdez v. State, 443 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that trial court has discretion whether to swear jurors singly or in a group); People v. Moss,
470 N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ill. App. 1984) (noting that the trial court retains discretion over exercise of
peremptories).
Kentucky and Texas employ a "struck" system of jury selection. Under this system each party
is given a list of potential jurors, then each party exercises its peremptory challenges. Thereafter, the
remaining names are given to the clerk of court. In Kentucky the clerk chooses twelve jurors at
random; in Texas the clerk selects the first twelve names on the list. See Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.36(2);
TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.26 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1985). In Texas the struck system
is used in noncapital cases, see Fuller v. State, 409 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), and in
capital cases when group voir dire is employed. See Koonee v. State, 654 S.W.2d 705, 709 (rex.
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process. 10 5 Cause challenges are designed to eliminate individuals who demon-
strate on voir dire actual or implied partiality. Peremptory challenges, which
may be exercised without giving a reason, are designed to eliminate individuals
whom the parties perceive as undesirable for any reason.
Lawyers rely on numerous factors in exercising their peremptories, includ-
ing facial expression, dress, demeanor, race, gender, responses to voir dire ques-
tions, background information obtained through investigation of prospective
jurors, and other available data. Sometimes, particularly in political trials or
trials of wealthy defendants, a lawyer may use psychological and sociological
data to interpret the available information and to predict the voting behavior of
Crim. App. 1983). In capital cases in which prospective jurors are questioned individually, the par-
ties must exercise their challenges as each juror is examined. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
35.13 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1985); see Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980).
The California, North Carolina, and New York statutes contain detailed provisions for the
exercise of peremptory challenges. All three states employ a "box" method of jury selection. In
California the requisite number of jurors required to try the case is called to the jury box and the
parties exercise challenges for cause. After the challenges for cause, the State is required to exercise
any peremptory challenges on the jurors in the box. If a juror is excused peremptorily by the State, a
replacement juror is called to the box. The State must tender an acceptable panel of 12 jurors to the
defense before the defense can be required to exercise any peremptory challenges. The defendant
then exercises his or her peremptory challenges. The 12 jurors acceptable to the defendant are then
passed back to the State, and the process continues until both sides accept the panel. During this
process of "passing" the panel, either side may challenge a juror it previously accepted. CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1088 (West 1985).
In North Carolina the prosecutor questions the first 12 jurors; they are not passed to the defend-
ant until the prosecutor indicates satisfaction with the panel. If the prosecutor exercises a challenge,
an alternative juror is immediately chosen for the box. Once the prosecutor is satisfied with the
panel, the defendant begins questioning. If the defense challenges a juror, however, no replacement
is chosen until the defendant indicates satisfaction with those remaining. Replacements are then
chosen and the prosecutor examines them first, then passes them to the defendant. The process is
repeated until 12 jurors satisfactory to all parties are chosen. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (1983).
In New York, the court calls a panel of 12 or more jurors for questioning. After both sides have
been given the opportunity to challenge the jurors for cause, the State must exercise its peremptory
challenges before the panel is tendered to the defense for challenge. The State cannot challenge ajuror whom it has previously passed. The process continues until a jury is selected. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney 1982).
The procedure for exercising peremptory challenges in Massachusetts is unclear, but it appears
that MAss. R. CRIM. P. 20(b) vests broad discretion in the court to determine the manner of exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 467 N.E.2d 214, 218-19 (Mass. App. 1984)
(implicitly approving the trial court's use of a struck system).
105. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 147. The first step in the process is the compilation of
names for the jury pool. From the pool of eligible jurors, a venire is selected, usually through a
random process. Persons qualified for exemptions then are excused. Those remaining are examined
through voir dire, and those who remain after challenges are exercised become the petit jury. Id.
Variations among the states regarding exemptions may affect the composition of the pool. See,
e.g., Brown, Eliminating Exemptions from Jury Duty: What Impact Will It Have?, 62 JUDICATURE
436, 437 (1979) (examining effects of eliminating list of exemptions in California in favor of "undue
hardship" standard).
Different practices regarding voir dire may also play a role in the value of available challenges.
In federal court, the judge typically conducts voir dire, G. BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE
EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 6 (1977), although the
rules afford the judge discretion to allow counsel to examine the prospective jurors. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). Other common methods of voir dire include allowing coun-
sel to conduct the inquiry and allowing both judge and counsel to conduct voir dire. See Levit,
Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 928-30
(1971).
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prospective jurors. 10 6 In most cases, however, the lawyer relies only on his or
her experience and intuition in interpreting information about prospective
jurors. 107
106. See Babcock, Voir Dire: "Preserving Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 558-61
& nn.50-56 (1975) (collective authority that discusses the use of social science experts in selecting
juries); Miller, Justice Ain't Cheap-A Defense Counsel's View of the Joan Little Cae, 7 SAN FERN.
V.L. REv. 59, 63-66 (1978) (discussing use of costly pretrial surveys to construct profiles of desirable
jurors); Saks, Social Scientists Can't Rig Juries, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 48 (social sci-
ence experts have been used in many highly publicized trials: Camden 28; Gainesville 8; Angela
Davis; Wounded Knee; Attica; Mitchell-Stans Conspiracy; Harrisburg 7).
107. Bar journals and trial magazines are replete with suggestions of things to look for in choos-
ing or rejecting a potential juror. The most common group of suggestions focuses on demographic
stereotypes-race, age, sex, and employment. Examples of the most common stereotypes appear in
these excerpts from articles offering advice on jury selection:
1. In picking a jury, we know that certain nationalities are emotional and react to sympathy.
Among these are the Italians, French, Jews, Spanish, Greeks, Slavs, and Irish. On the
other hand, the Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, Finns, English, and the other Nordics are
generally less apt to be swayed emotionally and less apt to return an excessive verdict ...
The Swedes, Germans, and Nordics by occupation are usually carpenters, mechanics,
scientists, etc. These endeavors necessitate accuracy, a sense of precision, and a logical
sequence of things. . . .On the other hand, the Latins and the Slavs engage more gener-
ally in the fine arts, such as music, drama, literature, painting, etc. This type of occupation
calls less for accuracy and is based upon emotion, sentiment, inspiration, and impulse.
Therefore, they have a flair for the dramatic; think less logically, and are apt to return
larger verdicts.
[W]e know that the Irish are very superstitious; that they have an innate dislike for the
English; that they like conviviality; and that they have a carefree spirit.
Arpaia, Hints to a Young Lawyer on Picking a Jury, 6 J. MAR. L.Q. 344, 345 (1941).
2. Women jurors are desirable [for the defendant] if the defendant happens to be a handsome
young man. . . .Women are desirable if the principal witness against the defendant is a
woman. Women are somewhat distrustful of other women. . . .The occupation of a wo-
man's husband is important, too, for generally she will feel and think in the same manner
as her husband.
Rothblatt, Techniques for Jury Selection, 2 CRiM. L. BULL., May 1966, at 18; see also Keiner, Jury
Selection: The Prejudice Syndrome, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1984, at 36. Kelner states:
[H]ell may have no fury like a woman juror who is to decide the case of a young and
attractive woman. The juror in such cases is apt to be a severe critic of the dress, speech
and deportment of the female plaintiff. The merits of the case may only be incidental.
Id.
3. I find that women on juries are extremely intolerant as to the complaints of their own sex.
When a woman plaintiff starts talking about back aches and headaches to another group of
women, she is talking about aiiments which most of the other women have had, and the
other women have never been paid for these back aches and headaches.
Heyl, Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL. B.J. 328, 340 (1952).
4. If the defendant is black, defense counsel should attempt to impanel a jury which is generally
young, above-average occupational status, above-average income, well educated, politically
liberal, not identified with organized religion or regular church attendance, and sin-
gle. . . . [J]urors of higher occupational status may not feel threatened by job competition
from blacks and, therefore, are more inclined to sympathize with a black defendant.
Salisbury, Forensic Sociology and Psychology: New Tools for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 12
TULSA L.J. 274, 289 (1976).
5. "Blacks favored acquittal more than whites . . .. There is some evidence that females and
blacks are more lenient and less 'conviction-prone' than men and whites." Mills & Bohannon, Juror
Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 23, 24-25
(1980); cf S. WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 75 (1981):
Some defense lawyers figured that black jurors were more likely to convict a black defend-
ant because they were frequently the victims of crime. But I wanted black jurors because I
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The accounts of lawyers describing their objectives during juror selection
are revealing. Their anecdotes, prescriptions, and war stories demonstrate that
lawyers do not set out to choose impartial jurors. Rather, most trial attorneys
probably agree with the following description of jury selection, written by a for-
mer chair of the American Bar Association Section on Litigation:
We all know that jury selection is a negative process. If you like a
juror a lot, your opponent will probably strike him. What kind of peo-
ple do I not want? I do not want those whose occupations, ages, social
background, marital status, education, and experience will lead them
to identify with my opponent and his position in the case. 108
felt they might have some sympathy or loyalty to a 'brother'; that was why most D.A.'s
knocked all blacks off the jury.
6. Generally, retired police officers, military men and their wives are undesirable. They have
adhered to a strict line of conduct throughout their lives. They believe if a man is arrested,
he is probably guilty. . . .Salesmen, actors, artists, and writers are highly desirable. They
have enjoyed wide and varied experiences, have witnessed the good and bad in people and
are prone to forgive an indiscretion in another. . . . Bankers, bank employees, members
of management, and low-salaried white-collar workers are generally undesirable. They
have been trained either to take or give orders, are forced to toe the line, and usually expect
others to do the same.
Rothblatt, supra, at 14, 19.
7. "Secretaries, teachers, and managers are trained to avoid mistakes and may be less tolerant of
those who deviate from societal norms. The first impression of engineers, machinists, programmers,
bankers, and accountants is likely to be that the accused is guilty." Johnson, Voir Dire in the Crimi-
nal Case: A Primer, 15 TRIAL, Oct. 1983, at 61, 65.
Many trial attorneys have voiced their personal biases in how to select a jury. Clarence Dar-
row, the well-known trial attorney of the early part of the 20th century, for example, noted that most
trials are between the rich and the poor, with the poor invariably the defendants. Darrow
admonished:
"Never take a wealthy man on a jury. He will convict, unless the defendant is accused
of violating the anti-trust law, selling worthless stocks or bonds, or something of that kind.
Next to the Board of Trade, for him, the Penitentiary is the most important of all public
buildings."
Plutchik & Schwartz, Jury Selection: Folklore or Science?, 1 CRIM. L. BULL., May 1965, at 4 (quot-
ing Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 211). As for ethnic groups, Darrow
had a decided preference for the Irish. "'An Irishman is emotional, kindly, and sympathetic. You
would be guilty of malpractice if you got rid of him. . . .Keep Unitarians, Universalists, Congrega-
tionalists, Jews and other agnostics.'" Id.
108. Hanley, The Last Thirty Days, 10 LITIGATION, Winter 1984, at 10. One commentator
summarizes her impressions of lawyers' objectives in voir dire as follows:
What do attorneys want in a jury? In theory, they want an impartial representative group
of people who will listen to and consider all the evidence fairly and bring in a verdict. In
practice, they want people who have some disposition, some tilt, toward their client, or
who can be tilted. Jury selection is, in the end, the manipulation of bias.
P. DIPERNA, supra note 74, at 113; see also J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 121 (lawyers do not strive to
choose impartial jurors); Comment, Computers and Scientific Jury Selection: A Calculated Risk, 55
J. URB. L. 345, 345 (1978) (discussion of use of computers asjury selection tool). The stereotypes on
which some lawyers operate may be inaccurate. For example, one pair of writers states that if Clar-
ence Darrow were right about how the Irish vote, then Ireland would be a utopia for the criminal
defense lawyer. Yet, they observe, "An examination of the prisons of Ireland reveals that, as a
general proposition, the cells are occupied." Plutchik & Schwartz, supra note 107, at 5.
Another writer reports research which leads to the conclusion that "Irish jurors are the most
conviction-prone ethnic group; Germans are not as 'merciless' as frequently imagined." Johnson,
supra note 107, at 65. Other research disproves the stereotypes that women and blacks are more
lenient and likely to acquit by finding that black females reached the highest percentage of guilty
verdicts. Mills & Bohannon, supra note 107, at 27. Some writers say attorneys' choices are based
merely on "superstitions," noting that " 'lawyers use their own general attitudes about people when
selecting a jury . . . like successful poker players and other gamblers, most criminal trial lawyers
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Although litigators may seek to eliminate jurors who will sympathize with
an opponent, they may not succeed in accurately predicting whether and how a
juror's occupation, age, social background, or other characteristics will bear on
voting behavior. Even lawyers who use expensive multidisciplinary data to
make their predictions may not substantially improve the accuracy of their juror
selection strategy. 10 9 One reason is that social research on jury performance is
have acquired some "superstitions" in their attitudes toward jury selection.'" Hawrish & Tate,
Determinants of Jury Selection, 39 SASK. L. Rnv. 285, 285 (1975) (quoting Mossman, Jury Selection:
An Expert's View, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at 78).
Darrow's preference for the poor and the Irish has been explained by his own preference for
them as people. "Darrow liked Irishmen, agnostics and poor people; he felt comfortable with them.
This was probably the real basis for his selection ofjurors." Plutchik & Schwartz, supra note 107, at
9.
Thus, the literature and accounts of actual practice indicate that jury selection may not produce
a jury of the peers of the defendant but a jury of peers of the defendant's attorney. This rule seems to
be true even when, over time, an attorney's choice of jurors proves to be the wrong choice over and
over again. Lawyers "selectively perceive" those behaviors that coincide with their own precon-
ceived biases and stereotypes and do not "learn" from inconsistent juror behavior. See Kallen, Per-
emptory Challenges Based on Jurors' Background, 13 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 143, 152-54 (1969); see
also Sperlich, Scientific Methods for the Selection of Trial Jurors: Practical and Ethical Considera-
tions (unpublished manuscript available at University of Florida School of Law).
109. Use of psychologists to help choose jurors was suggested, at least tangentially, as early as
1898, see Crothers, A Psychological Study of Jurors, 60 ALB. L.J. 341, 343-44 (1898), and was dis-
cussed more directly by the 1920s. See Christian, An Applied Psychology of the Court Room: Its
Possibilities, 12 VA. L. REv. 122, 126-29 (1925).
Psychologists employed to select juries often relyon several indicators in making their deci-
sions. One major indicator of a potential juror's behavior in the jury box is whether that person can
be classified as an "authoritarian" or "egalitarian." Some psychologists believe that lawyers use
demographic stereotypes to make this classification.
Our assumption [of the existence of an authoritarian personality] is implicitly expressed by
legal writers espousing rules of thumb for jury selection. They suggest many demographic
clues to reliance on authority. Groups traditionally believed to favor [the prosecution] as
an agent of society include (I) men; (2) Republicans; (3) upper income groups; (4) occupa-
tional groups such as bankers, engineers and certified public accountants, and others with
positions of petty respectability; and (5) members of the Teutonic ethnic groups, particu-
larly Germans. . . . [The following groups are more likely to be egalitarians: (1) women;
(2) Democrats; (3) middle and lower economic groups such as butchers; (4) certain occupa-
tional groups, such as social scientists; and (5) minority racial or ethnic groups, such as
Latins or Jews.
Fried, Kaplan & Klein, Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA, supra note 59, at 52.
The authoritarian/egalitarian theory was developed by researchers in the 1950s as a technique
to detect profascist or antidemocratic individuals. Authoritarians are believed to be "highly puni-
tive, racist, politically conservative, rigid, and acquiescent to authority figures.. . . [They are also]
more likely to change their opinion when faced by an authority figure's (expert) opinion which [is]
different from theirs." Frederick, Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 OHIO
N.U.L. REv. 571, 575-76 (1978).
A second source of information relied on by psychologists is a juror's "body language" (techni-
cally known as kinesics and paralinguistic communication). The theory underlying observations of
body language is that "body movements, posture, gestures, and vocal intonation and hesitation can
be combined to provide additional information about what a person is 'really' saying." Frederick,
supra, at 583; see also Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospective Jurors
During the Voir Dire, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 629, 630-37 (1978) (discussing psychological studies that
analyze communicative behaviors, such as rapidity of speech, eye contact, and facial cues that might
assist lawyers in "reading" jurors).
Another technique focuses on jurors' physical proportions. See Selection of Jurors Based on
Their Physical Characteristics, 3 CURRENT MED. FOR ATr'Ys, Sept. 1956, at 2, 4 ("studies have
shown that certain body types are basically generous people (endomorphs). . . . [E]ctomorphs...
[are] people who as jurors would be quite miserly (and tend towards small awards in personal injury
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limited. Another reason is that the accuracy and utility of available studies of
juror behavior are necessarily qualified by, among other factors, rules that pro-
hibit recording, listening to, or observing juror deliberations.110 Furthermore,
jury composition changes in each case and thus confounds attempts to make
general statements about jury decision making. Finally, studies about group de-
cisions performed in laboratory settings are of limited applicability to jury deci-
sions in actual cases."' 1
trials)."). Adkins, Jury Selection: An Art? A Science? or Luck?, 5 TRIAL, Dee.-Jan. 1968-69, at 37,
37, observes:
Some lawyers study physiognomy and believe that certain types of people have certain
characteristic responses. Fat people are said to be jovial; a fair complexion evidences a
warm heart with a sense of humanity; people with light hair are sympathetic; people with
thin, sharp faces are self-opinionated and stubborn.
See also Rothblatt, supra note 107, at 18 ("Physical characteristics are particularly important to the
lawyer defending a case in the Federal courts where selection of jurors is made without personal
interrogation, and only after the Judge has asked all the questions.").
Two additional techniques-use of a psychic and reliance on the defendant's own intuition-
were used in the highly-publicized trial of Joan Little, a black prison inmate accused of murdering a
white male guard who was found dead with semen on his leg and his pants, and whose shoes were
found outside Little's jail cell. McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Use of Social Science in Trials
with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter,
1977, at 205, 214 (1977).
One last technique, not often used, is handwriting analysis. Katz, The 7veh'e Man Jury, 5
TRIAL, Dec.-Jan. 1968-69, at 40 ("Many competent psychologists use graphology to determine per-
sonality traits of a particular juror and to detect if he has ever been in an accident, has any physical
defects, is generous, conservative, overbearing or mentally disturbed.").
While all the above techniques are utilized to varying extents, proponents of each technique
admit that there is no foolproof way to pick the perfect juror.
The field is not one of guarantees but of probabilities based upon generalities of human
behavior. Psychologists can forecast the likely cause of human behavior under certain
circumstances; sociologists can forecast what certain groups of people are like and how
they are likely to react as a group. But no science or art yet devised is able to predict
exactly what any individual or group will do in a given situation.
Salisbury, supra note 107, at 292.
Not only is juror selection unpredictable, even with the use of psychologists and sociologists, it
is also possible that the more sophisticated one becomes the less likely one is to select the desired
jurors. For example, in the Mitchell/Stans trial, United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), the defense attorney used every form of expert juror selection aid, but the experts'
predictions about voting behavior were completely wrong.
The former attorney general's lawyer had hired a professional jury selector, a member of a
new and growing body of professionals with backgrounds in the social sciences. The jury
selector, applying market research techniques long used in advertising, advised the trial
lawyer on the types of jurors most likely to be kindly disposed toward his client. After
much expensive research, this expert devised a profile of the ideal juror. Mitchell's lawyer,
taking his expert's advice, had picked fifteen working-class, not-very-well-educated ethnics.
Four more than the necessary twelve jurors had been selected in the event that any of the
original twelve could not complete the long trial. The sixteenth juror-a New York
banker-had been the exact opposite of the profile. To the horror of the defendants, the
nonprofiled juror wound up participating in the deliberations. However, the social science
expert's opinion notwithstanding, on the first vote in the jury room, according to Martin
Arnold of the New York Times, eleven had voted to convict-only the upper-class WASP
banker had voted to acquit. And over the days of deliberation, the non-perfect profile had
persuaded the other eleven to join his position.
S. WISHMAN, supra note 107, at 83-84.
Pointing to instances such as that involving the Mitchell/Stans jury, many lawyers feel they
have the ultimate solution: Do not employ experts, do not pick on the basis of demographics or
physical traits---"accept as jurors the first twelve people called out of a panel." Id. at 84.
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982).
111. See R. HAsTiE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 16, at 8.
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The most that can be said confidently about peremptory challenges, then, is
that they are used to eliminate people whom the lawyers perceive as biased or as
inclined to sympathize with an opponent. This point is critical to the conclusion
of this Article that the Supreme Court in Swain overvalued the state's interest in
peremptory challenges. No study has ever proven that lawyers' techniques for
exercising peremptories influence the verdict. The state's use of peremptories,
however, can affect the composition of the petit jury and can be employed to
produce juries that the defendant and the community perceive as biased against
the accused.
B. Use by the Prosecution
The most controversial aspect of the peremptory challenge is its use by the
prosecutor to exclude certain people whom he or she perceives to be inclined to
sympathize with the defendant. History supports both those who favor the
state's right to challenge jurors and those who would limit or eliminate this
right. Prior to 1305 juries in England were selected by the government. A per-
son unacceptable to the Crown could be removed easily because the right to
challenge was unlimited. 112 About 1305, however, a statute was passed that
removed the Crown's right to challenge jurors except for cause. 113 Despite that
statute, a practice developed whereby the Crown could request, for no stated
reason, that certain veniremen stand aside until the entire panel was exhausted.
The defendant, on the other hand, was required to exercise his challenges as the
veniremen were called. No limit was placed on the number of jurors the Crown
could ask to stand aside, and it was only after the panel had been exhausted that
the Crown had to state a cause for its challenges. 114 The effect of this practice
was to give the Crown a de facto unlimited number of "peremptory" challenges,
unless the panel was exhausted. 15
The English practice of allowing the government to request that prospective
jurors "stand aside" was not adopted by all jurisdictions in early America. New
York and Virginia allowed the prosecution no peremptory challenges until 1881
and 1919, respectively.11 6 Other states afforded the government some peremp-
tory challenges, although typically they were limited in number.1 7 During the
1800s the government's right to peremptory challenges became an accepted
practice, a development that may be attributable to an increased acceptance of,
and trust in, government power. 118
This history reveals the concern of the English and of some early Ameri-
112. W. FORSYTH, supra note 19, at 232; L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 56; Moore, Voir Dire
Examination of Jurors: I The English Practice, 16 GEo. L.J. 438, 447 (1928) (unlimited in capital
cases); see also United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827) (until the statute of
23 Edward 1, the crown could challenge any juror without cause).
113. See W. FORSYTH, supra note 19, at 232; L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 56; J. VAN DYKE,
supra note 54, at 148.
114. See W. FORSYTH, supra note 19, at 232.
115. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 148.
116. Id. at 149.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 150.
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cans about abuse of peremptories by the government. Nevertheless, in 1827 the
Supreme Court in United States v. Marchant1 19 interpreted this history as an
unambiguous confirmation of the government's power to challenge jurors. Ac-
cording to the Court, this history showed that "no. .. power of selecting his
jury belongs, or was ever supposed to belong, by the common law, to the pris-
oner." 120 Justice Field reiterated the Court's view in 1887: "[T]he power of the
legislature of a state to prescribe the number of peremptory challenges is limited
only by the necessity of having an impartial jury. . . .The right to challenge is
the right to reject, not to select a juror." 121 The Court carried its position one
step further in Stilson v. United States,122 holding that the criminal defendant
enjoys no constitutional right to peremptory challenges. Again, the Court indi-
cated that the defendant's only constitutional right is to an impartial jury. 123
Despite its statement in Stilson that peremptories are not constitutionally
required for the criminal defendant, the Court has consistently lauded the per-
emptory challenge as an important means of preserving the fairness of the jury
process.124 It is ironic that the Court's highest praise of peremptories occurred
in Swain, which involved the government's, and not the defendant's, use of the
challenges. The Court described the function of the peremptory challenge as
not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on
the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise. In
this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its high
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.' ",125
Many writers agree with the Court's assumption that peremptories are a
desirable, if not an essential, supplement to the challenge for cause. 126 Numer-
ous arguments have been offered in favor of peremptories. Some writers note
that cause challenges often are too narrowly drawn to provide adequate safe-
guards against bias. 127 At least one commentator has claimed that peremptories
are a necessary protection against questionable exercises of judicial discretion to
deny cause challenges.' 28 Other purported advantages of peremptories are that
they allow the parties to act on stereotypes that society would rather not ex-
119. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483-84 (1827).
120. Id. at 484.
121. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887).
122. 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
123. Id. at 586. But see Babcock, supra note 106, at 556 (arguing that Swain may be a "virtual
overruling of Stilson").
124. See, eg., Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20; Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1894);
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
125. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see infra text
accompanying notes 201-02 for a criticism of the Court's argument that allowing the state to exercise
peremptory challenges on the basis of race satisfies the appearance of justice.
126. See, eg., Babcock, supra note 106, at 554-55; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 14, at 341-42,
356-57.
127. See, eg., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 14, at 340.
128. See, eg., Lempert, Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 22 LAw QUADRANGLE NOTES
No. 2 at 8, 12-13 (Univ. of Mich. 1978), reprinted in R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE 349, 353-54 (1979); see also Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2891-92 (1984) (applying
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pressly admit through assigning them as a basis for a cause; 12 9 they permit the
elimination of jurors whom the lawyers fear they may have alienated in voir
dire;130 and they can be used to remove prospective jurors who are believed to be
biased but who deny any bias on voir dire.13 1
The assumptions that peremptories are an effective means of eliminating
bias and that state-exercised peremptories preserve the appearance of justice,
however, are dubious. Again, no studies confirm a relationship between lawyers'
use of peremptories and favorable verdicts. Moreover, the appearance of justice
can easily be defeated by discriminatory use of peremptories. Consequently, the
Court's professed belief that peremptory challenges are necessary to ensure fair
juries is based on tenuous notions. The Court's praise of peremptories also is
difficult to square with its treatment of the key to effective use of these chal-
lenges-voir dire.
C. Voir Dire
The value of the peremptory challenge is closely linked to the scope of voir
dire. Without an opportunity to elicit information on voir dire, a lawyer can
base the exercise of a peremptory only on untested assumptions about the rela-
tionship between certain visible characteristics, such as race, and voting pat-
terns. Although the Supreme Court has praised the use of peremptories, it has
provided only weak protection for voir dire. 132
a presumption of correctness to state court's findings whether individual jurors have opinions that
disqualify them as biased).
129. Babcock, supra note 106, at 553-54.
130. Id. at 554-55.
131. See, eg., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 14, at 356.
132. The parties may be able to obtain information about the veniremembers outside the court-
room. The government may have access to background information about the veniremembers
through government records. Wealthy defendants also may have the means to conduct background
investigations of panel members. See Babcock, supra note 106, at 558-59.
Whether the information elicited on voir dire is accurate and can be used correctly by most
attorneys is unclear. Many commentators believe that expansive voir dire can be an effective tool for
eliciting bias. See, eg., Abramovsky, Juror Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful
Voir Dire in Federal Criminal Prosecutions-Are They Endangered Species?, 50 FORDHAM L. REv.
30, 60 (1981); Babcock, supra note 106, at 563; Soler, "A Woman's Place. . . ": Combating Sex-
Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 535, 582-90 (1975);
Comment, Voir Dire Limitations as a Means of Protecting Jurors' Safety and Privacy: United States
v. Barnes, 93 HARv. L. REV. 782, 790-91 (1980); Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impar-
tial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS. L.J. 959, 982-83 (1982); Com-
ment, Procedure-Scope of Voir Dire-Defendants are not Deprived of the Intelligent Use of
Peremptories by Voir Dire Restrictions Intended to Protect Potential Jurors' Safety and Privacy, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 281, 284-85 (1979); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Voir Dire-The Right to
Question Jurors on Racial Prejudice, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) and Ristaino v.
Ross, 96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976), 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 412, 422 (1976). Other commentators question the
effectiveness of voir dire. See, eg., Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
CAL. L. REv. 503, 505, 513, 522-25 (1965) (concluding that voir dire is "grossly ineffective not only
in weeding out 'unfavorable' jurors but even in eliciting data which would have shown particular
jurors as very likely to prove 'unfavorable' "; that jurors may lie; and that voir dire often is abused to
indoctrinate jurors); Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis,
56 IND. L.J. 245 (1981) (concluding that voir dire is an ineffective way to elicit information because
it is analogous to self-disclosure interview and that the nature of voir dire and the courtroom setting
make self-disclosure unlikely); Note, Juror Bias-A Practical Screening Device and the Case for Per-
mitting Its Use, 64 MINN. L. REv. 987 (1980) (suggesting that a "legal attitudes questionnaire"
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In 1973 the Court ruled in Ham v. South Carolina133 that the trial judge
had erred in refusing to allow voir dire questioning about racial prejudice in the
trial of a young black man who was active in civil rights work. Relying on the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court concluded that "es-
sential fairness" required trial courts to allow defendants to question prospective
jurors about racial prejudice. 134 Only three years later, however, the Court in-
terpreted Ham so narrowly that the decision may now be limited to the facts of
the case. In Ristaino v. Ross135 the Court held that although the victim of an
assault and battery was a white security guard and the defendants were black,
there was no constitutionally significant likelihood that voir dire questioning
about racial prejudice was necessary to assure the jurors' impartiality.' 36
designed to identify extremes of attitudes toward authority might be a relatively inexpensive and
revealing supplement to voir dire); Note, Voir Dire-Prevention of Prejudicial Questioning, 50 MINN.
L. Rnv. 1088 (1966) (arguing against use of voir dire to indoctrinate jurors and advocating limit to
general inquiries into bias).
Related controversies are whether potential jurors' privacy interest should ever outweigh the
defendant's interests in an impartial jury, see United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143 (2d Cir.
1979) (limiting, on privacy grounds, the voir dire inquiry into ethnic and religious background);
Note, The Right of Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 708, 712-23
(1982) (proposing that judges balance the interests of prospective jurors in privacy against the par-
ties' right to a fair trial on a case by case basis), and whether the press should have access to voir dire
when inquiries must be made into sensitive matters. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104
S. Ct. 819 (1984) (holding that voir dire presumptively is open to public); see also Hager, Reformers
Take Aim at Jury Process, L.A. Times, May 7, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. 1 (discussing movement for jury
reform in California to save time and money and to protect prospective jurors from pretrial ques-
tions and investigations that invade their right to privacy).
In England, barristers rarely use challenges because challenges must be exercised before the
jurors are sworn, and questioning is allowed only after the oath. See L. MOORE, supra note 21, at
134; Case Note, 53 J. URa. L. 119, 120-21 (1975). The differences between the two systems have led
Moore to agree with the view that "'[i]n England, the trial begins when the jury is picked; in the
United States, the trial is over when the jury is picked.'" L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 134 (quoting
"an experienced barrister").
133. 409 U.S. 524 (1973). The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. Id. at 524.
He claimed that the government had framed him on the narcotics charge in retaliation for his civil
rights activities. The Supreme Court found no constitutional error in the trial judge's refusal to
inquire into the veniremembers' prejudice against people with beards. Id. at 527-28.
134. Id. at 527; see also Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931) (not relying on any
express constitutional grounds but holding that "essential demands of fairness" required that a black
man accused of murdering a white policeman should be permitted to inquire into racial prejudices on
voir dire).
135. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
136. Id. at 596. The Court tempered its ruling in a footnote by stating that under its supervisory
power it would require questioning regarding racial prejudice if a federal court were faced with the
same circumstances. Id. at 597 n.9. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), how-
ever, a plurality of the Court construed its supervisory power narrowly, holding that a trial judge did
not commit reversible error by refusing to ask specific questions regarding racial or ethnic prejudice.
The defendant, a man of Mexican descent, was convicted of participating in a scheme to bring Mexi-
can aliens into the United States. Id. at 184-85. The trial judge, who conducted the voir dire him-
self, asked the prospective jurors general questions regarding their possible prejudice toward
Mexicans and toward "the alien problem." Id. at 185-86. Justice White wrote the Supreme Court's
plurality opinion, which stressed the limited ability of appellate courts to second guess the trial
judge's discretion regarding how best to conduct voir dire. Id. at 188-89. The plurality opinion
established a nonconstitutional standard for voir dire into racial prejudice-that questions must be
asked when there is "a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced
the jury." Id. at 191. Justice White would have found this reasonable possibility whenever a defend-
ant is accused of a violent crime and the victim and the defendant are from different racial or ethnic
groups. Id. at 192. However, only four justices joined in this opinion; Justices Rehnquist and Bur-
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A criminal defendant has little assurance that peremptory challenges and
voir dire can always be used to protect his or her constitutional right to an
impartial jury. The defendant has no constitutional right to peremptory chal-
lenges, 137 and the scope of voir dire is a matter for the trial judge's discretion. 138
Absent compelling, dramatic circumstances, no specific voir dire inquiries about
prejudice are constitutionally required. 139 Thus, if the defendant believes that
veniremembers are prejudiced but have not admitted their prejudices, the de-
fendant has no clear constitutional right to challenge them without cause. The
defendant likewise has no constitutional right to question the veniremembers
about their prejudices, unless the defendant happens to match the profile of a
well-known black civil rights worker who claims that charges were brought in
retaliation for civil rights activities. Moreover, the state can exercise perempto-
ries to exclude veniremembers whom it believes may sympathize with the ac-
cused. The only limit on the state's right to exercise peremptories is that the
challenges cannot defeat the defendant's right to an impartial jury.
The absence of limitations on the state's exercise of peremptories raises the
question whether the government should be able to exercise its peremptories to
exclude veniremembers whom the defendant and the community regard as the
defendant's peers. The discussion below will show that the government's privi-
lege to exercise peremptories can become an abuse of power and can violate the
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.
IV. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY
EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORIES
The government's privilege to reject jurors is qualified only by the defend-
ant's right to an impartial jury. One might expect, then, that the Supreme Court
would have defined an "impartial jury" so that government power can be mea-
sured against a meaningful standard. It has not. The Court's holdings in jury
selection cases prohibit systematic and intentional discrimination and have re-
quired that jury pools-but not petit juries-represent a cross-section of the
community. The Court's holdings, however, focus only on preventing exclusion;
the Court has never required the inclusion of any group or individual. The re-
sult is a negative definition: an impartial jury is one that is not created through
procedures that violate the Court's exceedingly generous prohibitions against
ger in a concurring opinion rejected a per se rule regarding violent crimes. Id. at 194-95. Justices
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from the opinion. Id. at 195-203.
The trial judge in Rosales-Lopez exercised his authority to conduct the voir dire, rather than
allowing the lawyers to do so. Whether judge or counsel should conduct voir dire continues to be
debated. Some people argue that judge-conducted voir dire is less time consuming and avoids abuse
by counsel who use voir dire to condition jurors. Others maintain that lawyer-conducted voir dire is
essential to an effective and fair inquiry into all relevant areas. See Gutman, The Attorney-Con-
ducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A ConstitutionalRight, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290, 292 (1972); Moreau,
Voir Dire Legislation Stalled in Congress, 9 A.B.A. LITIGATION NEWS, Summer 1984, No. 4, at 1;
Stanley & Begam, Wzo Should Conduct Voir Dire?, 61 JUDICATURE 70, 76 (1977); Note, Attorney
Participation in Voir Dire Examination in Illinois, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1145, 1145 (1977).
137. Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586.
138. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981).
139. See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596-98.
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exclusionary practices. Despite the Court's narrow rulings, however, its rhetoric
about the right to trial by jury suggests that the composition of the jury is impor-
tant to the jury's impartiality and fairness.
A. Development of Nonexclusion Theory
The Supreme Court's nonexclusion approach to jury selection cases
originated in three 1880 decisions: Strauder v. West Virginia,140 Virginia v.
Rives, 14 1 and Ex parte Virginia.142 In these decisions the Court relied on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in holding that black men
may not be excluded from jury pools.143 These holdings, however, did not es-
tablish that a defendant had a right to a jury of any particular composition. 144
Since 1880 several different legal theories have been used to attack unlawful
exclusion injury selection procedures. Before 1968 the right to equal protection
was the inost common basis for constitutional challenges to state jury selection
procedures.' 45 However, since the Court's 1968 holding that the sixth amend-
ment right to an impartial jury is incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment,146 both sixth amendment and equal protection principles have been cited
in attacks on jury selection procedures. 147 The Supreme Court has also relied
on the due process clause in some jury selection cases, particularly cases in
which the impartiality of jurors is compromised by pretrial publicity. 148 In
other cases, the Court has eschewed constitutional theory altogether and instead
has relied on its supervisory power over the federal courts. 149 This last ap-
proach enables the Court to avoid an increase in appeals of convictions by state
courts without appearing totally insensitive to the fairness issues involved.
140. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
141. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
142. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
143. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08. The Court added that nothing in the fourteenth amendment
prevented the State from confining jury selection to males, freeholders, citizens, persons within cer-
tain ages, or persons with certain educational qualifications. Id. at 310.
144. Rives, 100 U.S. at 322-23. The Court stated the rule as follows:
It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the selection of jurors to pass
upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimina-
tion against them because of their color. But this is a different thing from the right which it
is asserted was denied to the petitioners by the State court, viz. a right to have the jury
composed in part of colored men. A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to the
equal protection of the laws, and the right to it is not given by any law of Virginia, or by
any Federal statute. It is not, therefore, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
145. See, eg., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Carter v. Texas, 177
U.S. 442 (1900); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896). As discussed infra, however, an equal
protection theory is not the proper basis for a defendant's challenge of discriminatory selection
methods. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
146. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
147. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
148. See, eg., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
149. See, eg., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
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The shifts in legal theories have been accompanied by shifts in rhetoric, but
the changes have not been simultaneous. The Supreme Court's early jury deci-
sions relied on the fourteenth amendment and dealt with the statutory exclusion
of black men from jury pools. Accordingly, the Court's rhetoric was primarily
one of equality, emancipation, and nondiscrimination. The right to a fair jury
per se was not the key issue in these cases; rather, these cases focused on the jury
as an important political body from which emancipated black men should not be
excluded by state law.1 50
During the 1930s the Court became pointedly critical of the states' contin-
ued de facto exclusion of black men from jury service. 151 The standard it ap-
plied to equal protection challenges to jury selection procedures, however,
remained the same: the defendant was required to show purposeful and system-
atic discrimination. 152 Although the states no longer excluded black men from
service by statute, in many areas jury commissioners applied selection criteria to
exclude black people. The Supreme Court looked beyond the states' facially
neutral statutes to determine whether substantive rights were denied by the se-
lection process. The overwhelming evidence of discrimination presented in the
cases that came before the Court 153 was sufficient to allow the Court to infer
that purposeful exclusion had occurred. The Court in these cases still invoked
equality and nonexclusion terminology; it did not address the larger issue
150. See, eg., Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Gib-
son v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder, 100 U.S. at
307-08. This focus does not mean, however, that early litigants did not urge the Court to extend its
theories and rhetoric beyond nondiscrimination. In Rives, 100 U.S. at 315, the black defendants,
accused of murdering a white man, requested that a portion of the petit jury be composed of black
men because they did not believe that an all-white jury would be impartial. The Court dealt at
length with the allegations of discrimination in the jury selection procedures. Id. at 318-23. No-
where did the majority address the argument that white jurors might not be impartial in judging a
black man accused of murdering a white man. This omission is remarkable, even given the times.
In the companion case of Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), Justice Field touched on the
issue of mixed juries in his dissent. Field's argument against a requirement that black people be
included in juries that try black defendants deserves attention, as the argument is still made by
opponents of mixed juries. He wrote:
The position that in cases where the rights of colored persons are concerned, justice will
not be done to them unless they have a mixed jury, is founded upon the notion that in such
cases white persons will not be fair and honest jurors. If this position be correct, there
ought not to be any white persons on the jury where the interests of colored persons only
are involved. That jury would not be an honest or fair one, of which any of its members
should be governed in his judgment by other considerations than the law and the evidences;
and that decision would hardly be considered just which should be reached by a sort of
compromise, in which the prejudices of one race were set off against the prejudices of the
other. To be consistent, those who hold this notion should contend that in cases affecting
members of the colored race only, the juries should be composed entirely of colored per-
sons, and that the presiding judge should be of the same race.
Id. at 368-69 (Field, J., dissenting); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 407 (1881) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (stating that if equal protection required that all persons are entitled to serve as jurors,
then it would abolish all distinctions in jury selection made between citizens and foreigners and
"between those of our race and those of the Mongolian, Indian, and other races, who may be at the
time within their jurisdiction").
151. See, eg., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935).
152. See, eg., Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938).
153, See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935) (noting that no black person had
ever served on a grand jury or petit jury within the memory of witnesses who had lived in the county
all their lives).
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whether affirmative inclusion of particular community members was an impor-
tant aspect of the right to an impartial jury.
In the 1940s Justice Black brought a new vocabulary to the discourse about
discriminatory jury selection procedures. In Smith v. Texas'54 the Court re-
versed the conviction of a black defendant after statistics showed that from 1931
to 1934, only 5 of 384 serving grand jurors were black and only 18 of 512 sum-
moned for grand jury duty were black.1 55 The Court concluded that although
the Texas statutory scheme as written was not unfair, it had been applied in a
manner that discriminated against black people in violation of their fourteenth
amendment rights.156 More important than the result, however, was Justice
Black's description of the role of the jury:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru-
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion
from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.' 5 7
This passage represented a significant departure from the tone of prior jury
decisions. It is the first time the Court described discriminatory jury selection
procedures as a compromise of community values and not just as a violation of
the potential black juror's right to equal treatment in jury selection procedures.
Even though the decision was based on the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause and not on the sixth amendment, Justice Black's description of the
jury as a body "truly representative of the community" went beyond a jury free
from discrimination and hinted that a defendant may have an affirmative right
to have certain members of the community included in the jury.
In Glasser v. United States'"8 the Court amplified Justice Black's dictum in
a case that did not involve the equal protection clause. Glasser concerned the
exclusion from a petit jury of all women who were not members of the Illinois
League of Voters. The jury that convicted Glasser was composed of six men and
six women, and the defendant raised no allegation of race discrimination.' 59
Glasser's challenge to the exclusion of non-League women was based on the fifth
and sixth amendments, which together guarantee the defendant trial by a jury
free from bias and prejudice.1 60 The Court determined that the deliberate limi-
154. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
155. Id. at 129.
156. Id. at 131-32. The Court so held, despite testimony by the jury commissioners that their
failure to select black grand jurors was not intentional discrimination but occurred "because they did
not know the names of any who were qualified" or were "not personally acquainted with any mem-
ber of the negro race." Id. The Court's response was that discrimination under the fourteenth
amendment "can arise. . . from commissioners who know but eliminate [blacks]." Id. at 132; see
also Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1942) (finding a "violent presumption" of discrimination
when no black person had been summoned as a juror despite facially neutral laws).
157. Smith, 311 U.S. at 130.
158. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
159. Id. at 84.
160. Id. Glasser objected to the League members because they attended "jury classes" taught by
lecturers who were prosecution-biased. Id. at 84, 86.
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tation of jury service to members of the League made the jury "not only the
organ of a special class, but, in addition .... openly partisan." 16' It noted that
jury officials should not allow the desire to choose competent jurors "to lead
them into selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a
cross-section of the community."' 162
The Court has continued to cite cross-representativeness as a characteristic
necessary to the democratic ideal of trial by jury.163 Although the Court created
this concept in an equal protection context, it since has described the concept as
an "essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."'164
Almost immediately after the cross-representative concept emerged, how-
ever, the Court made it clear that this objective did not mean the defendant was
entitled to a petit jury composed of all segments of the community.' 65 Obvi-
ously, no twelve-person jury could ever be "cross-representative" in this
sense. 166 Rather, the petit jury must be drawn from a source that is fairly repre-
sentative of the community.167 In defining a representative source, the Court
returned to the nonexclusion analysis of the equal protection cases. A represen-
tative jury pool is one in which no distinctive group in the community is under-
represented due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.168
Although the Court's cross-representative definition speaks only to the
nonexclusion of groups, the language the Court has used to explain that rule's
purpose betrays a broader objective-to assure that the jury will express com-
munity values.' 69 This goal becomes explicit in the Court's later decisions re-
161. Id. at 86.
162. Id. The Court went on to note, however, that Glasser had failed to offer evidence in sup-
port of his motion alleging that the jury was improperly constituted. Id. at 87.
163. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-70 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946).
164. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). The precise doctrinal basis for the require-
ment remains unclear, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357, 370 (1979). Justice Rehnquist stated:
The short of it is that the only winners in today's decision are those in the category of
petitioner, now freed of his conviction of first-degree murder. They are freed not because
of any demonstrable unfairness at any stage of their trials, but because of the Court's obses-
sion that criminal venires represent a "fair cross section" of the community, whatever that
may be. . . . I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended or should be
interpreted to produce such a quixotic result.
Id. at 377-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. See Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 n.5 (1985); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
538 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1946).
166. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1946). Moreover, if the cross-section
requirement were applied alone, it could defeat the defendant's right to an impartial jury, because it
could compel the seating ofjurors who represent a biased viewpoint. See Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.
Ct. 844, 852 n.5 (1985); infra text accompanying note 224 (discussing the balance between impartial-
ity and cross-representativeness).
167. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
168. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
169. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 (1975) ("[T]he administrative convenience
in dealing with women as a class is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community
judgment represented by the jury in criminal trials."); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972)
("When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect
is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
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garding jury size and unanimity of verdicts. In these cases the Court could not
avoid the question of what a proper jury must include, as opposed to what it
cannot exclude. Its narrow answer was that a jury must include at least six
people170 whose verdict must be unanimous;1 71 larger juries need not act unani-
mously.1 72 The reasons the Court gave for the six-person minimum reflect
greater ambitions for the jury than its disappointingly narrow holding allows.
One reason the Court cited for the minimum of six is that psychological and
sociological studies "raise substantial doubt about the ability of juries truly to
represent the community as membership decreases below six.' 173 The Court
also returned to dictum from Strauder, observing that a jury of less than six
could exclude elements of the community and thereby contravene "the very idea
of a jury. . . composed of 'the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine.' "174
The reasoning in the jury cases could lead one to believe that the Court
holds the jury in high esteem. It has described the jury as an instrument of
public justice, 175 as an integral part of our democratic heritage,' 76 and as an
assurance to the defendant of a judgment of peers, 177 phrases suggesting that a
proper jury should include a blend of voices and at least some of the defendant's
peers. The Court paints a dramatic picture of ajury that serves the many impor-
tant functions described previously-functions important to the defendant, to
the government, and to the community.
The Court's holdings, however, tell a different story. Although they pre-
vent intentional and systematic exclusion of certain groups from the jury pool,
they establish no requirement that the petit juries empanelled live up to the rhet-
oric. In essence, the only constitutional requirements the Court has set regard-
ing what constitutes a proper jury are that at least six people must be included
and that their verdict must be unanimous.
The gap between the Court's words and its deeds is manifest in Swain v.
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195
(1946) ("The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group...
or an economic or social class . . . deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by
Congress to have in our democratic society.").
170. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
171. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1979).
172. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359
(1972).
173. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 242 (1978). The Court continued:
Not only is the representation of racial minorities threatened in such circumstances, but
also majority attitude or various minority positions may be misconstrued or misapplied by
the smaller groups. Even though the facts of this case would not establish a jury discrimi-
nation claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the question of representation does consti-
tute one factor of several that, when combined, create a problem of constitutional
significance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id.
174. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308).
175. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
176. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
177. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09.
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Alabama.178 Robert Swain was convicted in the Circuit Court of Talladega
County, Alabama, of the rape of a white woman and sentenced to death.1 79
Relying on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,18 0 Swain
argued that the underrepresentation of black jurors in county grand jury and
petit jury venires, coupled with the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude black persons from serving on petit juries, constituted a violation of his
constitutional rights. His statistics showed that from 1953 to 1965 only ten to
fifteen percent of the grand and petit jury panels were black people. 18 1 More-
over, although an average of six to seven black people had been on the petit jury
venires, not one black person had served on a petit jury since 1950.182 Eight
black persons were included in the venire in Swain's case, but none served; two
were exempt, and the remaining six were struck by the prosecutor.183
The Court found no violation of Swain's constitutional rights on these facts.
First, it noted that Alabama had neither excluded black persons from jury
panels nor included them in token numbers, as the average six to eight black
persons on each panel showed.184 Although blacks were underrepresented in
the jury venire by as much as ten percent, this factor alone did not prove inten-
tional discrimination against blacks. 18 5 The Court noted that a defendant has
no constitutional right to demand that a proportional number of his or her race
be represented in the jury venire or the jury roll. 186 In the Court's words,
"[T]he selection of prospective jurors was somewhat haphazard and little effort
was made to ensure that all groups in the community were fully represented
... . [b]ut an imperfect system is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination
based on race." 187
Second, the Court concluded that the prosecutor could constitutionally use
peremptories to exclude all black persons from the panel. The Court viewed
peremptory challenges as "a suitable and necessary method of securing juries
which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and impartial."1 88 Thus,
the prosecutor was entitled to strike prospective jurors on the basis of their
group affiliations--"whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those
178. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
179. Id. at 203.
180. Because Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not yet been decided, sixth amend-
ment principles were not involved. Post-Duncan decisions, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975), in particular, rely on the sixth amendment and have been viewed by some commentators as
evidence that Swain may no longer be controlling law. These commentators read Taylor as ex-
tending the cross-representation principle beyond selection of the jury pool to the petit jury selection.
See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 168-69; Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge, supra
note 7, at 1731. Other commentators correctly point to the limited holding in Taylor as support for
the argument that Swain remains good law. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 14, at 347-48.
181. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 206.
185. Id. at 208-09.
186. Id. at 208.
187. Id. at 209.
188. Id. at 212.
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
with blue eyes." 189 The Court established a presumption that a prosecutor will
use the government's challenges to secure an impartial jury, a presumption that
is not overcome by evidence that in a particular case all black people were re-
moved from the jury or that they were removed because they were black.190
Rather, to overcome the presumption, the defendant must show that the prose-
cutor "in case after case, whatever the circumstances," has eliminated black per-
sons from the jury.191 The evidence in Swain was deemed inadequate to
overcome the presumption;192 therefore, the conviction was upheld.
B. Criticisms of the Court's Approach to Discriminatory Use of Peremptories
Critical reading of Supreme Court cases dealing with discriminatory exer-
cise of peremptories reveals significant analytical and practical problems. The
first problem is the Court's assertion that the defendant's constitutional right to
an impartial jury is violated only when a pattern of discrimination is established.
The Constitution guarantees each defendant a fair jury, not just the last defend-
ant in a series of defendants who have been deprived of this guarantee. Past
discrimination is relevant to a particular defendant only insofar as it supports an
inference of discrimination in that defendant's case. Similarly, the absence of
discrimination in past cases should not defeat the individual defendant's claim of
discrimination or his or her interest in a fair trial.
A related analytical problem stems from the Supreme Court's reliance on
the equal protection clause. The Court's early decision to apply equal protection
analysis to the exclusion of black people from juries was a necessary step for-
ward in creating fair jury selection procedures. Until the sixth amendment was
deemed to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in 1968, the Court
likely saw no other constitutional text that would allow it to correct the patent
and egregious violation of the rights of black male citizens. The notion that the
exclusion of blacks from juries violates the defendant's right to equal protection,
however, is analytically infirm. The equal protection claim belongs to those who
are barred from juries by the government's exclusionary practices. 193 The black
defendant is treated "equally" if both black and white defendants are tried by a
jury of people chosen after cause and peremptory challenges have been exer-
cised. Undeniably, the exclusion of black people from juries is unfair to the
black defendant. The equal protection clause, however, is not the appropriate
basis for a challenge to this unfairness.
Due process analysis likewise will not prevent the exclusion of blacks from
juries unless the Court concludes that white jurors cannot fairly decide cases
189. Id.
190. Id. at 222.
191. Id. at 223-24.
192. Id. at 224-25.
193. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (exclusion of persons of Mexican descent
from jury service because of ancestry violates fourteenth amendment); see also Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (unsuccessful challenge to law granting preference to veterans for civil
service jobs on ground law deprived women of equal protection); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (test for police officers did not deprive blacks of equal protection under fifth amendment),
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involving black defendants. 194 The Court obviously could not reach such a con-
clusion without casting doubt on its own ability to be fair; due process principles
apply to bench trials as well as to jury trials. The Court cannot publicly ac-
knowledge, let alone embrace, a view that one's color determines absolutely
one's ability to understand and judge fairly another person. 195
The problem remains, however, that people regard the exclusion of blacks
from juries as unfair to black defendants, particularly in cases in which racial
prejudice may determine the result. One assumption that probably underlies
this reaction is that white people may not be fair judges of black people. Yet
white, male, middle-class, middle-aged judges regularly decide cases involving
people of every color, gender, age, and background. The Supreme Court cannot
and will not hold that litigants are treated unfairly simply because the judge does
not share their socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, society does not expect
the Court to so hold. Society accepts this disparity of power or at least is con-
tent to correct it through the long-term solution of opening the opportunity to
become judges to all groups.
194. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), therefore, was decided on the wrong theory. The Court
in Kiff, a case involving a white defendant, held that a defendant of any race may object on due
process grounds to the exclusion of black people from the jury. Id. at 504. In an opinion written by
Justice Marshall, the Court noted that the exclusion of blacks not only injures black defendants but
other defendants as well because it "destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a representative
cross section of the community." Id. at 500. Despite the absence of any evidence of actual harm to
the defendant, the Court concluded that unconstitutional jury procedures "create the appearance of
bias in the decision of individual cases, and ... increase the risk of actual bias as well." Id. at 503.
This risk of bias was not confined to cases that involved issues which present a clear opportunity for
race prejudice to operate, nor was it confined to cases involving the exclusion of black people. Id.
The Court observed:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experiences, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.
Id. at 503-04. The three dissenting justices in Kiff refused to accept Justice Marshall's argument
that the absence of certain voices might produce bias and that the mere possibility of bias was suffi-
cient for a successful due process claim. Id. at 509-11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Bur-
ger correctly noted that although juries should not be deprived of the insight of identifiable segments
of the community, Kiffdid not involve the essential attributes of trial by jury: the case was tried two
years before the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), held that the sixth amendment
applied to the states. Kiff, 407 U.S. at 510-11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
195. If the exclusion or absence of certain groups from a jury results in a biased jury, however,
and if that bias can be proven through evidence other than the mere assumption that certain groups
are biased against others, then due process principles apply. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 261-63 (1970) (application of due process principles to termination of welfare benefits). The
cases that involve the effects of pretrial publicity on jurors and the attitudes of potential jurors
toward the death penalty also implicate due process values. Pretrial publicity and fixed opinions
regarding the death penalty can affect a juror's ability to be impartial. To the extent that a juror has
a fixed bias that will have a direct and adverse effect on how he or she views the defendant, due
process requires that the juror not decide the defendant's fate. The sixth amendment guarantee of an
"impartial jury" also may apply, but the sixth amendment concept of impartiality is not coterminous
with the due process concept of impartiality. See infra text accompanying notes 205-17.
The argument that a defendant's race may affect a juror's judgment finds support in a recent
article that canvasses social science data and concludes that whites are more likely to convict black
defendants than white defendants in similar circumstances. See Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1643-50 (1985).
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This societal acceptance, however, does not extend to jury verdicts; society
does expect juries to include people like the. accused. The reason is that the
symbolism and function of a jury of laypeople are different from the symbolism
and function of a professional judge. A judge wears a robe and has training and
status that separate him or her from the parties. Only one judge decides the case
in a bench trial; a jury trial involves at least six fact finders and hence implies
that its purpose is to include more perspectives-black and white-in the ver-
dict. In other words, the exclusion of black people from a jury that tries a black
defendant violates society's sense of a fair jury, not of a fair hearing. Accord-
ingly, the proper constitutional text for challenging the exclusion of black jurors
from the trial of black defendants is the sixth amendment and not the right to
due process or equal protection.1 96
196. This point becomes clearer when one moves beyond the narrow problem of Swain to con-
sider the exclusion of other groups from the jury. Cases that involve gender discrimination in jury
selection procedures reveal that the equal protection doctrine and nonexclusion rhetoric of the early
race discrimination cases simply cannot embrace all aspects of the values that the jury right repre-
sents. The Supreme Court has decided a series of cases concerning whether state or federal jury
selection procedures can exclude women from jury duty. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-
70 (1979) (invalidating Missouri law that granted all women an automatic exemption from jury
service upon request); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (sixth amendment prevents the
systematic exclusion of women from jury service); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (Flor-
ida statute that granted women an absolute exemption from jury duty by putting only women who
volunteered for jury service on the jury list was based on a reasonable classification and thus did not
violate the fourteenth amendment); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (in a five to
four decision, Court exercised supervisory power over administration of justice in the federal courts
to prevent intentional and systematic exclusion of women). When the only constitutional texts avail-
able were the due process and equal protection clauses, it was difficult for the Court to invalidate
state jury selection procedures that excluded women. Women were not deemed to be a suspect class,
the history of the jury clearly did not include women as jurors, and the states could offer what then
was considered a rational basis for the exclusion of women-that is, that women played a special,
domestic role in society which made their participation in public affairs a hardship. See Hoyt, 368
U.S. at 61-62 ("Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protec-
tions of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be
reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life."). Moreover, the
long history of all-male juries made specious any argument that no all-male jury could be impartial.
As attitudes toward the role of women changed, however, the "rational basis" for excluding
women from jury duty became suspect. Also, once the Court began to cite community participation
justifications for preventing the exclusion of segments of society from juries, the stage was set for a
change in the constitutional analysis of the exclusion of women from juries.
In 1975 the Court held that states could not require that women affirmatively "opt in" to the
jury rolls, a practice that had resulted in a very low number of women jurors. Taylor, 419 U.S. at
533-35. The reason given for this ruling was not that women were necessary for an impartial jury or
that the male defendant in that case was prejudiced by the exclusion of women. Id. at 53 8-39 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Rather, it was that "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross
section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."
Id. at 528. Moreover, to restrict jury service to special groups or to exclude identifiable segments of
the community would be to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id. at 530.
Although the fair cross-section requirement had been applied previously to allow the exclusion
of women, it could no longer be construed in that manner. In the Court's words, "Communities
differ at different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or place is not necessarily
a fair cross section at another time or a different place." Id. at 537. This statement implicitly ac-
knowledges that a proper jury is defined according to contemporary expectations of fairness. By
1975 women were perceived to be full participants in the political "community." Consequently,
contemporary notions of fairness required that they be included in the jury selection process. The
Court's rationale in requiring that women be included in jury pools was based neither on equal
protection nor on due process, but was instead based on the community participation function of the
jury. Thus, the sixth amendment was the constitutional text that required their inclusion.
The cases that address the issue of how many jurors are necessary for a proper jury likewise
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The Court in Swain not only relied on the wrong constitutional text, it also
misplaced its legal priorities. It admitted that peremptory challenges-presuma-
bly especially those of the state-are not constitutionally required. Yet it ex-
alted the state's privilege to exercise peremptories over a clear constitutional
interest-the defendant's right to an impartial jury. Unless the Court in Swain
intended to overrule its earlier holding that peremptory challenges are not con-
stitutionally mandated, it violated the accepted rules of constitutional
interpretation.
The Swain Court stressed the need to preserve the appearance of fairness.
In the Court's view, the peremptory challenge "affords a suitable and necessary
method of securing juries which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair
and impartial." 197 The authority the Court cited for this sentiment concerns
fairness to the accused only, not fairness to the state.' 98 Apparently aware of
this weakness in its reasoning, the Court relied on the general assertion that "the
view in this country has been that the system should guarantee 'not only free-
dom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
prosecution.' "199
Although the Court was correct in observing that the state has an interest
in an unbiased proceeding, it erred in concluding that peremptory challenges are
essential to preservation of this interest. The peremptory is an uncertain tool for
eliminating bias; it has never proven to be essential or effective. The state's in-
terest in a trial free from bias is adequately protected by the state's opportunity
to challenge veniremembers for cause. The effect of Swain, however, is to pro-
tect the state's peremptory challenges at the expense of the integrity of the pro-
ceeding, particularly when, as was true in Swain, the peremptory is exercised in
a manner that may defeat the accused's constitutional right to an impartial jury.
When a conflict arises between the state's interest in a fair jury and the accused's
right to a fair jury, the Constitution provides the solution: the defendant's sixth
amendment interest prevails. 20°
suggest that the sixth amendment is the correct text for resolving questions about appropriate jury
procedures. Those cases attempt to preserve the jury's ability to represent the sense of the commu-
nity by holding that a minimum of six people must be empanelled and that a six-person jury must
reach a unanimous verdict to satisfy the sixth amendment guarantee. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130, 138-39 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978); see also Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (twelve-person jury need not reach unanimous verdict); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (lack of unanimity on twelve-person jury does not indicate
reasonable doubt standard was ignored); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-103 (1970) (sixth
amendment is satisfied by six-person jury; twelve-person jury not constitutionally required). The
Court has expressed concern that the jury include enough people so that it would operate free from
outside intimidation-a sort of "safety in numbers" argument. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
100 (1970).
197. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.
198. Id. at 219 (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (peremptory challenge
deemed "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused")).
199. Id. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
200. As the Supreme Court has said in a related context:
In light of the great potential for harm latent in an unconstitutional jury-selection
system, and the strong interest of the criminal defendant in avoiding that harm, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of giving the opportunity for challenging the jury to too many
defendants, rather than giving it to too few.
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Even apart from these doctrinal issues, the Court's mention of the appear-
ance of fairness is disturbing. The "appearance of fairness" is precisely what the
jury in Swain did not preserve. An all-white Alabama jury assembled to hear an
interracial rape case hardly appears fair. The integrity of the proceeding was
further compromised by the active role of the state prosecutor in producing the
monochromatic result.
The most disconcerting feature of Swain, however, is the Court's suggestion
that all forms of discrimination are equal. Defending the peremptory challenge,
the Court asserted that the peremptory "provides justification for striking any
group of otherwise qualified jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes,
Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes."' 20 1 No imaginable case would
call for striking people with blue eyes. Accountants are unlikely to be vulnerable
to challenge in many cases. Catholics conceivably might be struck in some
cases. But none of these other bases for challenge carries the political and social
meaning of a challenge to a black veniremember on the basis of race. The
Court's insinuation that all of these bases are equivalent ignores history, policy,
and common sense.20 2 The all-white jury that convicts a black defendant is
deeply disturbing to many people. In contrast, juries composed entirely of non-
Catholics, non-accountants, or non-blue-eyed people are unlikely to provoke
comment, let alone outrage.
The final significant shortcoming of Swain is that the standard it embraces
provides no protection against the discriminatory exercise of peremptories.
Few, if any, defendants are able to meet the high burden of proof imposed by
Swain.203 The Court's imposition of this burden of proof reflects a belief that
the intentional exclusion of black persons from juries through the action of state
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972).
201. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.
202. The Miami riots offer powerful and disturbing evidence of the cost of ignoring the appear-
ance of unfairness of all-white juries. See Reynolds, Fla. Court Overturns Swain Rule, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 30, col. I (noting that riots erupted in Miami after some all-white juries acquitted
police officers charged with killing black people); Stuart, Miami Drive Is Mounted to Get Blacks on
Juries, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984, § 1, at 23, col. 1 (noting that proponents of changing jury selec-
tion laws to place more blacks on juries believe the change "might give verdicts more credibility
among black citizens and lessen the prospects of unpopular verdicts being responded to with vio-
lence, as occurred [in Miami] over the past two days"). In 1965 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said
that some people
have come to the conclusion, based upon bitter experience, that Negroes can expect little
more than lynch law justice from Dixie juries. So they regard the courts as mere instru-
ments of continuing oppression. Many have decided to provide their own recourse to jus-
tice, having been provoked to protect themselves through resort to arms and vigilante
justice.
Dr. King Calls for Federal Jury Selection Laws, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1965, at 30, col. 3.
203. For a discussion of the burden of proof, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. One
writer advocates the application of statistical theory to judicial review of charges of discrimination in
jury selection. Applying probability theory to the figures presented in Swain, Finkelstein concludes
that the probability of venires with five or fewer black persons in Talladega County was one in more
than one hundred million trillion groups. That is, if 30 jury venires were picked at random in
Talladega County, Alabama, every day of the year, the daily selection of juries would meet the facts
of Swain only one day, on the average, in thousands of trillions of years. This statistical analysis
lends strong support to the conclusion that blacks were intentionally and systematically excluded
from Swain's jury. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimina-
tion Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 338, 357 (1966).
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and federal prosecutors is an acceptable practice. The Court and defenders of
Swain must believe that such exclusion is not serious enough to warrant action.
One can only speculate whether the majority in Swain would have regarded
the problem of discriminatory exercise of peremptories as more grave if the de-
fendant had been a white man convicted and sentenced to death by an all-black
jury in Washington, D.C., for the rape of a black woman and a black prosecutor
had struck all whites from the jury. To pose this question fairly, however, the
facts would also have to include a history of political, social, and economic op-
pression of white people by a ruling majority of black people.
The Court may be unable to acknowledge this last argument against Swain.
In effect, the argument questions whether members of the political majority can
be fair judges in matters involving the rights of the political minority. If the
Court were to admit that the political majority might not be fair judges, the
fairness of a vast number of the Court's own judgments would be questionable.
Moreover, the remedy to the problem might be to compel the immediate ap-
pointment of a significant number of minorities to judgeships and to juries so
that all persons would be judged by members of their own group. Whether or
not this is a remedy that the Court should grant, the Court is unlikely to con-
sider it seriously.
A feasible proposal for reform thus cannot proceed on the basis that white
people cannot judge black people fairly or vice versa, even if this conclusion
were demonstrably true in some or even all cases. Nevertheless, most people
probably believe that the imagination and empathy of humans-including
judges and jurors-are necessarily limited by human experience, which is de-
fined in part by one's race. Most people probably would also agree that exclu-
sion of black people from the jury in Swain produced a panel whose ability to
judge the defendant fairly was at least dubious. The problems of prejudice and
of the differences in experience that race can produce are important aspects of
the unsatisfactory result in Swain. The Court seemingly ignored these difficult
issues. To persist, however, in ignoring problems that the vast majority of peo-
ple know exist is to risk serious compromise of the Court's integrity and credibil-
ity. Consequently, the Court this term must admit that the problem of
discriminatory exercise of peremptories is serious and that it does warrant
action.
V. FORGING A SOLUTION TO FAIR JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
In this section the Article offers a solution to the problem of discriminatory
exercise of peremptories addressed in Swain. It attempts to define the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to trial by jury. It discusses the key terms
"impartial, .... cross-representative," and "peer," and attempts to reconcile the
values that underlie these terms. Based on this conceptual framework, the Arti-
cle proposes a new procedure to accommodate the multiple values of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury and to produce, in a greater number of cases,
juries that correspond to widely shared notions of fairness. The proposed solu-
tion is to abolish the prosecutor's privilege to use peremptory challenges.
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Professor Kurland has identified three requirements for the success of any
fundamental decision based on the equal protection clause. These requirements,
which are equally relevant to a decision based on the sixth amendment, are as
follows:
The first requirement is that the constitutional standard be a simple
one. The second is that the judiciary have adequate control over the
means of effectuating enforcement. The third is that the public acqui-
esce-there is no need for agreement, simply the absence of opposi-
tion-in the principle and its application. 2°4
A Supreme Court decision to abolish the prosecutor's privilege to use peremp-
tory challenges would meet each of these requirements.
A. The Relevant Terms and Values
To identify the sixth amendment as the correct text is only the first step
toward a workable and doctrinally sound solution to Swain. The second step is
to identify the terms that define the nature of that constitutional provision. Us-
ing the correct terms and ordering the values that the terms represent will pro-
duce a better linguistic framework for discussing and solving issues of fair jury
procedures.
The three terms that figure in discussions about the jury are "impartiality,"
"cross-section of the community," and "peers." These terms overlap in some
respects, but are diametrically opposed in others. For example, a jury of peers
may not be impartial and may not represent a cross-section of the community.
Likewise, a jury of "impartial" individuals may not include peers or reflect the
composition of the community. All three terms, however, represent important
sixth amendment values. The difficulty lies in developing procedures that give
appropriate weight to these various values and that preserve the appearance of a
fairjury. The goal of the procedures should be to produce juries that correspond
to the visual image of the jury as it appears in the center panel of the triptych.
That is, the procedures should produce a jury that is composed of some-but
not all-defendant empathizers, and some-but not all-victim empathizers.
1. "Impartial"
The word "impartial" is the only one of the three terms that actually ap-
pears in the Constitution. 205 The sixth amendment guarantee of an "impartial
jury" was probably intended to insure the impartiality of the individual jurors
and of the process by which jurors are selected.206 If the term were taken to
require only that the jurors be impartial, it would arguably be redundant because
204. Kurland, Equal Education Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Unde-
fined, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 583, 592 (1968).
205. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See supra text accompanying note 48 for the language of the sixth
amendment.
206. Van Dyke notes that President Jefferson, in his first inaugural address in 1801, referred to
"trials by juries impartially selected" as a principle of American justice. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF PRESIDENTS 323-24 (J. Richardson ed. 1876), quoted in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 47. This
reference suggests a double meaning of the sixth amendment: the individual jurors must be impartial
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the due process clause has been construed to require an impartial tribunal. 20 7
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that this first type of "impartial-
ity"-that of the individual jurors-is a relative quality not capable of precise
definition.20 8 To the extent that an impartial juror can be defined, he or she is
one who is indifferent to the parties or who, in the words of Lord Coke, is "'in-
different as he stands unswome.' "209 This definition means that the impartial
juror is one who will base a verdict on the evidence developed at the trial210 and
not on any preconceived notion about the defendant's guilt or innocence.
211
The sixth amendment right to an "impartial jury" and the component of
this right that assures that the jurors be "impartial" are independent con-
cepts. 212 Truly impartial jurors, of course, are merely a theoretical objective
because everyone has preconceived notions or opinions that incline him or her to
decide one way or another. On this point, the Court and commentators
and the jury selection procedures must be impartial, that is, not skewed in favor of a certain group or
point of view.
Van Dyke reads the limited historical evidence regarding how the colonists defined the term
"impartial" to show that "our country's founders meant at least a jury that was not biased in favor
of the prosecution, a jury independent of outside influence, a jury that was-as far as could be
ensured-fair." J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 47.
207. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970).
208. The Court in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936), described impartiality as
follows: "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of
this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and
procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula."
209. COKE ON LrrTLETON 155b (18th ed. 1832), quoted in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961); see also Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892) ("A juror who has conscientious
scruples on any subject, which prevent him from standing indifferent between the government and
the accused, and from trying the case according to the law and the evidence, is not an impartial
juror."); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) ("It is to be remembered that. . . impartiality
requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.").
210. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
211. Id. at 723. The Court has noted, however, that impartiality does not require that a juror
have no preconceived idea about the accused's guilt or innocence; rather, "[iut is sufficient if the juror
can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court." Id.
212. The recent case of Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984), distinguishes the impartial juror
from the impartial jury, at least for purposes of habeas corpus review. When reviewing a case in
which the partiality of an individual juror is questioned, the Court will treat that issue as a question
of fact and afford the state court's decision great deference. Id. at 2891-92 n.12. The impartiality of
the jury as a whole can be compromised by adverse pretrial publicity, which creates such a presump-
tion of prejudice in the community that an individual juror's claim that he or she can be impartial is
not believable. Id. at 2889. The Court on habeas corpus review will overturn the state court's
findings about the impartiality of the jury as a whole only when it finds "manifest error." Id.
The distinction made by the Court in Patton between the impartial juror and an impartial jury
differs from that offered in this Article. The Court did not actually describe two types of impartiality
but rather two ways in which the impartiality of individual jurors may be determined. The first way
is to ask the individual on voir dire if he or she can be impartial and then to evaluate the truthfulness
of the response. The second way, which the Court describes as furthering impartiality of the jury as
a whole, is to presume that individual jurors cannot be fair when pervasive publicity in the commu-
nity makes any contrary assertion incredible. In both cases, however, the issue is whether individual
jurors can be fair. This Article argues that a true distinction exists between an impartial juror and an
"impartial jury" insofar as the phrase "impartial jury" also includes the concepts of cross-represen-
tativeness and peers. The fairness or impartiality of the jury as a whole is a far more complex issue
than whether the individuals who comprise that jury are impartial.
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agree.213 Consequently, an impartial juror is not a completely neutral person,
but is one who evidences no extreme bias for or against the accused.
The impartial juror ideal must be qualified by several other practical obser-
vations. First, the traditional means by which lawyers attempt to uncover
whether prospective jurors are impartial, voir dire, is a crude means for identify-
ing all prospective jurors who harbor significant prejudice or bias.2 14 Second,
the parties' ideas about "impartiality" play the primary role in defining that
term in actual operation. Only the parties, through their attorneys, can exercise
challenges to eliminate "partial" jurors. The Supreme Court's concept of an
impartial juror as one who has no bias favoring either party therefore will often
have no bearing on whether the jurors sworn are actually indifferent; if the par-
ties perceive the jurors as impartial, a court will not interfere.215 Moreover, the
way that lawyers exercise their challenges indicates that they do not seek to
empanel "impartial" jurors but instead try to eliminate those partial to their
opponents.2 16 The interests that the "impartial juror" concept protects are,
therefore, like the jury right itself, first and foremost the litigants' interests.
213. See, eg., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 731 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723
(1961); Babcock, supra note 106, at 551; Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An
EmpiricalStudy, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916, 925 (1971); Logan & Cole, Reducing Bias in a Jury Source
List by Combining Voters and Drivers, 67 JUDICATURE 87, 87 (1983); Note, Community Hostility
and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 349, 349-50 (1960).
214. Some bias may be unconscious so that the veniremember could swear in good faith to be
impartial yet not be. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 728 (1961); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of
Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1495-96 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes
137-39 for a discussion of other reasons voir dire may not uncover bias.
215. According to one observer, the result of this process is that jury selection reflects the social
and political attitudes of the lawyers who conduct voir dire. See P. DIPERNA, supra note 74, at 107.
216. Several commentators have made this point, as the following passages show:
"Of course, lawyers proclaim sanctimoniously that they only seek fair and impartial jury, but
pious protestations aside, what they really want is a jury that will favor their side and help them
win." Brody, Selecting a Jury-Art or Blind Man's Bluff?, 4 CRIM. L. REv. 67, 68 (1957).
The true administration ofjustice contemplates a trial of the issues by a fair and impartial
jury. The attorney, in most instances, prefers ajury which is prejudiced, or at least leaning,
in favor of his cause. The party, bluntly, wants to win, and anything less is not true justice.
Adkins, supra note 109, at 37.
Nobody wants fair juries any more. They want juries that are selectively predisposed to
their position. They say, "Get rid of the fair people. Get people that favor my position."
. . . Jury selection should not be a game in which each side tries to pick the 12 most ideal
jurors from their standpoint. We collectively-plaintiff, defendant, and judge-should be
aiming to pick 12 people who can be fair.
Improving the Jury Selection Process, 73 ILL. B.J. 160, 160 (1984) (statement of Chief Judge David
DeDoncker in panel discussion).
The general consensus gleaned from these articles is that attorneys pay lip service to the ideal of
an impartial jury, but the goal of jury selection is actually to produce a biased jury. To further this
aim, attorneys increasingly hire psychologists and sociologists to help them pick the perfect jury.
Comments regarding jury selection by these "experts" make it clear that the objective is to pick a
biased jury. "As we try to get more selective by doing psychological profiles to get the 12jurors who
are the best leaners toward our side of the case, we get further and further away from the search for
truth." Id. at 160.
"In most instances, given an acceptable, favorable set of facts, the jury is going to give a verdict
to the person they like the most. I realize that this does not sound like proper administration of
justice but it is one of the psychological factors I take into account." Address given by Dennis
Harrington, 88th Annual Convention of the Tennessee Bar Association (June 10, 1969), reprinted in
Harrington & Dempsey, Psychological Factors in Jury Selection, 37 TENN. L. REV. 173, 173 (1969).
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More properly, as is true of the sixth amendment right generally, the constitu-
tional interest in impartial jurors belongs to the defendant. 2 17
The procedures that protect the defendant's interest in "impartial" jurors
are voir dire and cause challenges. These devices help assure that no juror with
a specific bias against the accused or the prosecution will hear the case. The
result of voir dire and the exercise of challenges should be a jury that is reason-
ably fair to both sides and that will decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented. A jury composed of all "impartial" jurors, however, will not satisfy
the triptych's center-panel image of a fair jury. For example, twelve "impartial"
persons could be selected froni one group or sector of the community. Although
these twelve jurors might harbor no specific bias towards the accused or the
state, together they would not appear to be a "fair jury." A "fair jury" is not
merely a group of impartial fact finders, but is one that is drawn from all sectors
of the community and that includes some people who are the defendant's peers.
That is, the fair jury ideal not only requires that the jurors individually appear
fair-impartial-but also that the composite jury appears fair.
2. "Cross-Section of the Community"
The second key term, "cross-section of the community," focuses on the jury
as a whole and not on the individual jurors. Like the term "impartial," the
cross-section concept represents a theoretical ideal that is impossible to achieve
in any given case. Specifically, the cross-section ideal represents the community-
centered interest of participation in the jury system by all people.218 The prem-
ise of the cross-section requirement is that if all or several community groups are
included in the jury process, the jury will be better able to withstand intimida-
tion from the government, its verdict will better reflect the conscience of the
217. The state has an interest in jurors' impartiality, but this interest is not grounded in the sixth
amendment. The defendant alone has a constitutional right to an impartial jury. This right does not
include the right to jurors who are partial to the defendant. When the defendant's constitutional
right ends, the government's power to fashion whatever system of adjudication it deems appropriate
begins. This right may include a system that allows the state to exclude jurors who are partial.
218. The defendant is interested in a cross-representative jury only to the extent such a jury
might be more likely to include someone with life experiences similar to those of the defendant
(peers) or might be less likely to be hand-picked from one sector of society that is biased against the
defendant (impartiality). The defendant desires empathy and fairness, best ensured by having some
peers in the jury box. The government in its prosecution role likewise is uninterested in securing a
cross-representative jury. The prosecutor seeks jurors who will identify with the victim of the crime
and who will punish people found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The assertion that the cross-section requirement represents a community-centered interest is
qualified to the extent that "impartiality" and "cross-representativeness" intersect. The Court in
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), suggested that an "impartial jury" is one in which group
biases have the opportunity to interact. Id. at 530-31. Thus, if many groups are represented, their
several viewpoints will be addressed and considered by the jurors. The result should be an impartial,
or at least less partial, verdict. If the cross-section rule works to further impartiality, it could indeed
further defendant-centered interests. In that context, however, the cross-section rule is merely an
adjunct of the impartiality objective and does not represent an independent value. Likewise, to the
extent a cross-representative jury is more likely to include the defendant's peers, it may further the
defendant-centered interest of a jury of peers. Again, however, cross-representativeness is a means
to a different end and not an independent feature of a proper jury. Only the community interest in
participation in the justice system provides a basis for cross-representative juries that is independe-t -
of the interests in impartial jurors and in juries of peers.
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community, and the verdict will be respected by a greater segment of society. 21 9
The procedure that protects this interest is a jury selection process that includes
all segments of the community in the jury pool by consulting representative
source lists and by limiting the statutory exemptions to jury service.
Recent federal220 and state22 1 court decisions have invoked the cross-sec-
tion concept as an analytical framework for offering alternatives to Swain. The
concept does not, however, respond to the real issue in Swain. The problem in
Swain was not that the petit jury failed to represent (or even approximate) a
cross-section of the community. Rather, the problem was that no blacks were
included in the jury and that the state prosecutor produced that result.222 No
one has expressed concern about the absence of shopkeepers, Hispanics, young
people, females, or representatives of any other community groups from Swain's
jury.
No single petit jury ever has or ever will represent a true "cross-section of
the community." To persist, then, in the argument that a fair jury is one that
gives the defendant the opportunity to select a "cross-representative" jury with-
out intentional interference by the prosecutor is to pursue an analytical dead
end. Even if a prosecutor were to waive the state's peremptory challenges, the
jury would be unlikely to represent a cross-section of the community. If cross-
representativeness is a constitutional requirement, the mere theoretical "oppor-
tunity" to obtain such a jury hardly seems an adequate protection of this right.
The likely result of citing the cross-section requirement as the basis for objec-
tions to Swain will be to elicit an opinion, probably authored by a member of the
conservative wing of the Court, correctly exposing the illogic of the approach.223
This analysis is not to suggest that the cross-section concept has no bearing
on the sixth amendment or that the intentional exclusion of black people from a
jury does not violate that concept. The triptych analysis of the jury and the
jury's various functions demonstrates the limited relationship between the cross-
section requirement and the sixth amendment right. One function of the jury,
although not the only function,' is to satisfy a community-centered interest in
participation in the justice system by injecting representative community voices
and values into the decision proiess. This community concern is satisfied by a
219. See, eg., Apodaca v. Oregon,..406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972).
220. United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 370-75 (5th Cir. 1985); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
1113, 1128 (2d Cir. 1984).
221. See cases cited supra note 8.
222. One commentator has noted that the problem is not that the parties are entitled to a fair
cross-section. Rather, the problem is that the exclusion of people based on their group affiliation
offends the principle that group affiliation alone does not determine whether one can be impartial.
See Note, supra note 14, at 1781. Thus, the commentator observes:
A peremptory challenge exercised on the sole ground of group affiliation suggests that a
particular juror is unfit to give the defendant a fair trial, not because of her own idiosyn-
cratic prejudices, but rather as the inevitable consequence of group antagonism. This as-
sumption perpetuates stereotypes that are no longer tolerated in any other area of the law.
Id.
223. This prediction is based on Justice Rehnquist's ascerbic dissent in Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 376-78 (1979), especially the footnote at 371, in which he criticized the cross-section
theory. Id. at 371.
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jury that includes several different community groups and that is selected
through a procedure that over time is likely to include every group. Conse-
quently, a rule that prohibits only systematic and intentional violations of the
cross-section ideal is true to this community-centered aspect of the jury. Occa-
sional mistakes or even occasional intentional miscarriages of justice will not
defeat the community interest, provided that the system, on the whole, works
well. Consistent random selection of jurors from a truly cross-representative
source list or jury pool should satisfy the community's interest in the cross-
section ideal.
The community, however, is not the first priority of the sixth amendment;
the accused is. The community obviously reaps a derivative benefit from fair
treatment of defendants under the Bill of Rights, but the sixth amendment is not
explicitly concerned with protecting the community.
The cross-representative requirement 224 could actually defeat the defend-
ant's right to a fair jury. Depending on how local rules define the geographical
area from which jury pools are to be selected, a cross-section of the "commu-
nity" could be a totally homogeneous group of citizens known to harbor strong
ill-will toward people of the defendant's race or background. Also, if cross-rep-
resentativeness were the only criterion for a fair jury, then individuals with overt
prejudices against an accused would have to be empanelled because all voices
and values would need to be "represented" in the verdict. This construction of
the Constitution, of course, has not been, and never will be, adopted. The point
is simply that "cross-representativeness," taken alone, does not define a "fair
jury" for the accused.
The cross-section ideal may operate to benefit some defendants; representa-
tive juries are more likely to include people who are like the defendant than are
juries culled from only one group of society. For minority defendants, however,
this ideal may offer little benefit. Even a jury that mirrors the community per-
fectly may include only one or no members of the defendant's group. The cross-
section requirement means only that members of the defendant's group should
have the same voice in the verdict that they have in the community in general.
Unfortunately, this democratic principle works well only for defendants who
already have considerable representation in, and hence whose values and exper-
iences already are understood by, the community. the cross-section require-
ment represents valid sixth amendment interests, but it can operate to defeat the
sixth amendment right to a fair jury in certain circumstances.
3. "Peers"
Judges and commentators have noticed the potential harshness of the cross-
representative jury, even if it is composed of impartial jurors. Their awareness is
reflected by their occasional use of the third term, "peers," when describing a
224. The Supreme Court defines a cross-representative jury as *one that is drawn from a pool in
which no distinctive community group is underrepresented due to systematic discrimination in the
selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes
163-74.
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fair jury.2 2 5 This last term is the most elusive of the three key terms in the jury
discourse and therefore requires more extensive consideration. Unlike the terms
"impartial" and "cross-representative," the term "peers" has not been used as
the basis for specific jury selection procedures designed to preserve the values
that the term represents. Rather, the term largely has been cited in passing,
without real study of its meaning or of its potential importance to fair selection
procedures. Nevertheless, the term represents a significant aspect of a fair jury
and should be preserved in modem sixth amendment doctrine.
Although the United States Constitution makes no mention of "peers,"
most people believe the Constitution entitles them to a "jury of their peers."'2 26
The Supreme Court itself has defined a jury as "a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to deter-
mine."' 227  The dictionary defines a peer as an "equal,' 228 implying that
nonpeers are unequal or at least different. Before a defendant can be granted a
trial by a jury of his or her peers, an effort must be made to define the criteria by
which one person is to be judged the "equal" of another and then to reconcile
those criteria with the sixth amendment.
At one level, a jury of one's peers may mean simply a jury composed of
people reasonably independent of government influence. Any persons who are
not government officials and who are not employed by the government as profes-
sional judges or prosecutors satisfy this definition of equals.229
A second, complementary interpretation of a jury of peers focuses on the
differences that exist among nongovernment-affiliated citizens. Under this view,
more is expected of a "peer" than that he or she be free from government affilia-
tion. This view presupposes that a common bond or shared characteristic exists
225. References to peers as a part of the right to trial by jury appear in federal cases, see, e.g.,
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)); in legal periodicals, see, e.g., Potash,
supra note 96, at 80 ("The objection of the minority defendant is that generally the jury is not
composed of the minority defendant's 'peers.' "); in commentaries on the jury, see, e.g., P. DI
PERNA, supra note 74, at 82; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 9-13; in lawyers' discussions of trial
tactics, see, e.g., F. BAILEY, To BE A TRIAL LAWYER 115 (1985) ("The United States Constitution
provides that one is entitled to a trial by a jury of his peers."); in jurors' accounts of their jury
service, see, e.g., E. KENNEBECK, supra note 87, at 70-71; M. TIMOTHY, supra note 87, at 35 (quot-
ing Angela Davis); in modem plays, see, eg., Moore, Angela is Happening, in THE DISINHERITED:
PLAYS 164 (A. Ravitz ed. 1974); and even in popular humor. Comedian David Brenner tells his
audience that the Constitution grants us the right to a jury of our peers and that "peers" means that
the jurors "never peered into a book." Performance by David Brenner, Gainesville, Florida (Apr.
21, 1985).
226. See supra note 225.
227. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 306, 308 (1880). This interpretation of a jury composed
of peers probably stems from both English history and colonial American practice. See supra text
accompanying notes 17-19.
228. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 845 (1973) defines a "peer" as: "1: one that
is of equal standing with another: EQUAL 2: archaic: COMPANION 3a: a member of one of the
five ranks (as duke, marquess, earl, viscount, or baron) of the British peerage b: NOBLE."
229. This definition of peers as nongovernment-affiliates is subject to further refinement. The
question arises whether government employment of any kind should disqualify a juror. The answer
in the United States has been that it does not. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 165-67, 172
(1950); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134 (1936); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
218-21 (1982) (no bias inferred when juror was seeking job with prosecutor's office).
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between the defendant and some jurors that enables those jurors to hear and
understand the defendant better than others might. Examples of potentially rel-
evant characteristics include the juror's race, religion, gender, or socioeconomic
status. Implicit in this interpretation of peers is the assumption that differences
among groups of laypeople affect their perceptions of events and of each other
and hence the way in which they judge one another. 230
The argument that the sixth amendment requires juries composed of peers
who meet this latter definition is problematic at first glance. First, the sixth
amendment does not use the word "peers," despite prevalent use of the term in
colonial constitutions. Second, the premise of American government is that "all
men are created equal" and hence all are peers.2 31 Third, it is enormously diffi-
cult to define who may be described as a peer.232 Fourth, even if we were able to
establish criteria for the status of peer, the requirement that courts affirmatively
consider those criteria when selecting juries would be a form of "affirmative ac-
tion" unpalatable to most people. Last, the Supreme Court consistently has re-
230. The assumption that people of different status, experience, age, race, gender, and so forth
may not understand each other and hence may judge each other differently finds support in some
psychological studies. See, e.g., D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVEsTIGATION-FROM HY-
POTHESIS TO PROOF 151 (1984) (citing B. COLLINS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119-25 (1970)) ("When a
witness is in some way similar to a fact finder, a witness' credibility may increase. And when the
witness is dissimilar, credibility may well decrease."); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 25-35 (Jurors
tend to be more sympathetic to defendants from their own racial or socioeconomic background.).
But see The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 103, 103 (1965) (reporting that some
white lawyers who represent black defendants believe black jurors may be harsher to black defend-
ants than are white jurors).
231. The sentiment is expressed eloquently in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896):
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citi-
zens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
Of course, Justice Harlan's dissent states an ideal. The problem, as always, lies in developing
constitutional doctrine that not only acknowledges this objective but that also hastens its attainment
for all people. The latter often entails color-conscious or gender-conscious remedies. See Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303 (1986).
232. Shaufelberger poses the problem as follows:
At the core of the Anglo-Saxon conception ofjustice and of the jury system, is the idea that
one's peers can best judge one's actions. But the political and social development of the
Anglo-Saxon world during the seven hundred and fifty years since the Magna Carta has
created a problem of which nobody dreamt in 1215, 1628, or even 1760. The problem can
therefore not be solved by appeal to the authority of "the barons," or Coke, or Blackstone.
For philosophical reasons, the Constitution is no help either. And although this problem is
very real and touches the quick of the jury system, American jurisprudence and the judici-
ary have never allowed the pertinent questions to be asked, let alone answered them. The
problem is: Who is today, whose peer?
A. SHAUFELBERGER, supra note 19, at 125; see also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 11 (concluding
that it is administratively impossible to define "peers" and "community" for each case); cf. Saltzburg
& Powers, supra note 14, at 366-68 (discussing the difficulty in deciding whether and when group
affiliations are relevant to jury impartiality); Note, "Who is a Negro" Revisited: Determining Individ-
ual Racial Status for Purposes of Affirmative Action, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 683, 691 (1983) (discussing
the imprecision of race as a scientific criterion).
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fused to require peer representation on the petit jury.233
A closer look, however, reveals that the concept of peers as people with
common bonds is implied by the sixth amendment. The history of the clause is
relevant, although not dispositive. The colonists' intense debates about the geo-
graphical area from which the jury should be drawn demonstrate their concern
about which laypersons would serve as jurors.234 The sixth amendment's re-
quirement that juries be drawn from "the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, ' 235 which emerged from the neighborhood restric-
tion of some colonies, 236 reflects this concern. Displaying an awareness of this
parochial aspect of the jury, the Supreme Court on one occasion defined peers as
the defendant's "neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal
status in society as that which he holds."' 237 The colonists desired justice deliv-
ered by their own community, by people like themselves. Thus, one cannot dis-
regard their second interpretation of peers without compromising an important
facet of the jury.
Another historical example of the significance of same-group membership
to a jury of one's peers is the ancient jury de medietate linguae. The history of
the jury de medietate linguae dates back to the thirteenth century. Under John's
Charter of 1201, in all actions against Jews the defendant was entitled to a judg-
ment by Jews.238 Later statutes guaranteed a foreign merchant the right to a
jury de medietate linguae, which meant that half of the jury had to be composed
of people from his country. For example, a Welshman tried in England was
entitled to a jury composed of equal numbers of Englishmen and Welshmen, 239
provided a sufficient number of foreign merchants could be found.240
The practice of including aliens on juries in trials of aliens was known in the
United States, but developed in a different manner than the English practice.
Professor LaRue 241 cites the history of the American practice in his analysis of
why the United States Supreme Court in 1880 disapproved of the intentional
233. See, ag., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
237. Strauder v. West Virginia,. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
238. Clark, supra note 18, at 30. This privilege was not afforded Jews out of "English liber-
alism," but was to protect the Crown's property interest, established by law, in Jews and all their
effects. See LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 849 (1976).
239. W. FonsY'TH, supra note 19, at 228-30; Clark, supra note 18, at 30.
240. W. FoRsYTH, supra note 19, at 229. An interesting and somewhat analogous historical
footnote is the obsolete practice in England whereby a female defendant who claimed to be pregnant
would, if pronounced guilty, be entitled to a panel of 12 women whose duty it was to examine the
defendant to determine if she was "quick with child." A pregnant defendant might be spared execu-
tion. Moore describes this practice as "the only jury of women in the history of the English jury, at
least before the twentieth century." L. MOORE, supra note 21, at 78-79. In the American colonies
this jury was known as the matron's jury. Comment, Right to Trial by Jury- Whether Presence of
Women on Juries Impairs the Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury, 18 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 103, 104
n.14 (1939). One writer notes, however, that "[e]ven in these exceptional cases. . . the women were
not the sole judges of the fact, for the jury contained, in addition to the twelve women, twelve men as
well, and the examination was performed by the women in the presence of the men." Miller, The
Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REv. 30, 31 (1922).
241. LaRue, supra note 238, at 841.
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exclusion of blacks from juries242 yet refused to require their inclusion.2 43 La-
Rue reports that the jury de medietate linguae apparently was used in America
until the middle of the nineteenth century.244 The decline of this form of jury
was not, according to LaRue, caused by hostility to aliens. The expressed reason
for the decline was that "things had changed" 24 5 so that the right to this type of
jury was perceived as unnecessary. In particular, an "alien" in the United States
could change his or her status to "denizen" simply by making a permanent set-
tlement, paying certain fees, and taking an oath. 24 6 In England, an alien could
become a denizen only through the Crown's grace. 247 Thus, the privilege of the
alien jury was more critical in England than in the United States. Moreover, the
original purposes of the alien jury likely were to promote the commercial policy
of encouraging alien merchants to trade in England and to assure fair dealing.248
The significance of these interests was diminished in America, again because
aliens could easily change their status.249
As this history indicates, the colonists realized that in some circumstances
human empathy and understanding hinge on individual experience and thus can
affect how people judge one another. Although the colonists surely would have
rejected the argument that a jury that tries a woman defendant must include
women, they accepted, at least for a while, the arguments that an alien should be
tried by other aliens and that a defendant should be tried by his or her "neigh-
bors." The basic premise that differences may produce barriers to understand-
ing was understood; only the perception of what differences may be significant
was deficient. The term "peer," therefore, viewed in its historical context, must
be reconstrued to accommodate modem perceptions of relevant differences and
similarities among people.
242. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
243. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). In Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 320-21
(1906), Justice Harlan stated this principle as follows:
A different conclusion in this case would mean that, in a criminal prosecution of a negro
for crime, an allegation of discrimination against the African race, because of their race,
could be established by simply proving that no one of that race was on the grand jury that
returned the indictment or on the petit jury that tried the accused; whereas, a mixed jury,
some of which shall be of the same race with the accused, cannot be demanded, as of right,
in any case, nor is a jury of that character guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
What an accused is entitled to demand, under the Constitution of the United States, is that
• ..there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of
their race or color.
See also Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) ("Fairness in selection [of jurors] has never been
held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury."); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
394 (1881) (noting that a mixed jury is not a constitutional right, although intentional exclusion of
the members of a race is unconstitutional).
244. LaRue, supra note 238, at 850.
245. Id. at 862.
246. Id. at 857.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 850 (quoting J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
MON LAW 94 n.4 (1898)).
249. LaRue suggests that the reason the Supreme Court opposed intentional exclusion of blacks
from juries but deemed their mandatory inclusion unnecessary may have been that intentional exclu-
sion would make blacks "permanent outsiders," as aliens were in England. Id. at 862. Once inten-
tional exclusion was prohibited, however, the Court saw no political reason to aflbrd black people
the right to a special jury. Id. at 863.
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To impose this version of the peer concept on the criminal jury raises two
potential definitional problems, both of which are surmountable. One problem
is that "peer" may be misinterpreted to mean a "friend" of the accused. The
theoretical aim of the criminal law is to protect society through predictable and
appropriate enforcement of majoritarian standards of conduct. Juries composed
of sympathetic "friends" of the defendant may be unwilling to enforce these
standards and may thereby threaten the community's interests.
The idea behind the peer concept as defined herein, however, is to assure
empathy, not sympathy, for the accused. Empathy in this sense means the ca-
pacity for participating in or vicariously experiencing another's feelings, voli-
tions, or ideas. It is a form of understanding. Sympathy, in contrast, suggests
an affinity or relationship with another such that the feelings, volitions, or ideas
of another are shared or mutually experienced. Sympathy is a form of shared
caring and will incline one to reach a particular result without regard to applica-
ble neutral standards. In contrast, one can empathize and yet still judge
impartially.
The quality of empathy is important to a fair hearing for many reasons.
Determinations of guilt or innocence are not objective decisions that even impar-
tial people can perform without regard to the defendant's individual worthiness,
experience, or personality. Deciding "who did it" or "what happened" can in-
volve credibility decisions, evaluations of eyewitness testimony, and estimations
of the weight of circumstantial evidence. Evaluation of these factors may differ
according to a juror's experience. For example, the juror's life experience would
probably affect how he or she views the evidence in the "consent rape" case
discussed earlier.250 A jury that includes the defendant's peers-people who are
able to identify with the defendant and his experiences-may view the prosecu-
tion's case very differently than would a jury of people who are merely "impar-
tial" or who are peers of the alleged victim.
This point is made very effectively in the early twentieth century short
story, "A Jury of Her Peers."'251 In Susan Keating Glaspell's story, two women
and three men go to the Wright home to investigate a murder. Mr. Wright has
been strangled with a rope in his sleep. Mrs. Wright, who has been taken into
custody, is the suspected murderer. The five people search the Wright house for
clues to the crime.
The story emphasizes the dramatic difference between the women's per-
spective of the Wright home and the men's perspective. The women find a mo-
tive for Mr. Wright's murder in a stove that does not work, in their knowledge
that Wright was a hard and unyielding man, in their view of Mrs. Wright's life
as oppressive, isolated, and joyless, and in the discovery of a dead canary whose
250. See supra text accompanying note 82.
251. Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in EVERYWEEK, Mar. 5, 1917 (copy on file at NORTH CARO-
LINA LAW REVIEW office). The parallels between the facts of Glaspell's story and Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1961), are sobering. Still today, juries that decide cases in which a wife murders
her husband after years of emotional or physical abuse need not, under constitutional law, include
women.
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neck had been broken and whose body had been wrapped in a piece of silk and
hidden in Mrs. Wright's sewing basket.
The women discover not only who killed Mr. Wright but why. The men,
however, see only that Mrs. Wright must have committed the murder without
discovering a clue as to the motive. The male county attorney concludes, "[I]t's
all perfectly clear, except the reason for doing it. But you know juries when it
comes to women. If there was some definite thing-something to show. Some-
thing to make a story about. A thing that would connect up with this clumsy
way of doing it."'252 The women see perfectly the reason for the murder. One of
them remarks, "If there had been years and years of-nothing, then a bird to
sing to you, it would be awful-still-after the bird was still."'253 When the
women leave the farmhouse, one of them places the dead bird in her pocket,
thereby removing the only evidence of a motive that a jury would need to con-
nect Mrs. Wright to the murder.
Significant to this story is that the two women, one of whom is the sheriff's
wife, are mindful of the seriousness of Mrs. Wright's deed. At one point, the
sheriff's wife observes to the other woman, "The law has got to punish crime,
Mrs. Hale."'2 54 But these women also perceive that the crimes committed in the
Wright home were several. The women decided-out of empathy, not sympa-
thy-that enough suffering and punishment had been meted out.
This story is a compelling illustration of the potential tension between em-
pathy and obedience to majoritarian standards of conduct and of the difference
that life experience can make in one's understanding of the facts and in one's
judgment of the accused. Interpreting facts and judging defendants are the two
things a jury must do; if one jury performs these functions differently from an-
other, they are likely to reach different results. The title of the story, "A Jury of
Her Peers," implies that the author understands the potential for differing judg-
ments and that she defines "peers" as the term is used herein. The resolution of
the story suggests that the author approves of the peer judgment as a fair one.
The peers she depicts, however, are not friends of the accused. They offer in-
sight and understanding, not pity or passion. Thus, to argue that the peer con-
cept is important to a fair jury is not to advocate partial judgments or
sympathetic hearings by people unfairly aligned with the defendant or opposed
to the prosecution.
The second, more difficult, problem with the peer concept lies in deciding
who is whose peer in a given situation. For example, assume that the defendant
is a white woman, in her early thirties, married, born in the South, and raised as
a Catholic. If she is accused of killing her husband because he was beating her
and she feared he would kill her, are her peers all young women? All married
women? All battered women? If she is accused of embezzling money from an
employer to pay creditors, who are her peers? All embezzlers? All women with
financial problems that might motivate them to steal? All people in her socio-
252. Glaspell, supra note 251, at 21.
253. Id. at 19.
254. Id. at 20.
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economic group? If she is employed as a police officer and is accused of violat-
ing the civil rights of a black arrestee, who are her peers? All police officers? All
Caucasians?
A juror's ability to understand the defendant's actions in these three scena-
rios would depend on different aspects of the juror's life experiences. A jury of
all men would be troublesome in the battered wife hypothetical, a jury of all
employers would be troublesome in the embezzlement hypothetical, and a jury
of all black people would be troublesome in the civil rights hypothetical. More-
over, at least two, and possibly three, of these troublesome characteristics would
be visible to the defendant and to the community: gender and race are observa-
ble and hence news-reportable255 characteristics. Although whether one is an
employer may not be a visible trait, attire may signal socioeconomic status,
which, in turn, may be perceived as affecting one's empathy with a defendant
accused of stealing money from an employer. The fact that a trait is observable
and reportable is of vast significance to the acceptability of the jury's verdict,
because only obvious, reportable traits can affect the appearance of justice to the
public. Jury composition becomes even more disturbing to the defendant and to
the community when the government intentionally excludes women, whites, or
nonemployers from the jury through peremptories. In that event, the body
255. The "news reportable" features of the jury play a significant role in the appearance of fair-
ness in jury procedures and in the acceptability of jury verdicts. As Professor Kurland admonishes,
one key to the success of a fundamental constitutional law decision is that the public acquiesce. See
supra note 204 and accompanying text. Acquiescence will hinge in part on public awareness and
perception of the decision. If the Supreme Court fashions sixth amendment law that produces juries
that most people would regard as unfair, and if that unfairness is visible and made known to the
public through news reports, then the law will not succeed. The increased use of television cameras
in the courtroom should expand public awareness of court procedures and consistently underscore
the need for visually acceptable procedures. The "appearance of justice" likely will become an in-
creasingly significant factor in court procedures.
That some jury features are deemed newsworthy by reporters is reflected in news accounts of
trials. See, eg., Jury Selection Near in CBS Libel Suit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, § Y, at 18, col. 4,
which described the jury in the General Westmoreland libel suit as:
[Two accountants, one 33-years-old and the other 42; a 32-year-old insurance casualty
underwriter; a 24-year-old foreman at a cosmetics manufacturing plant; the 53-year-old
owner of a gift shop; a 26-year-old dental assistant; a 55-year-old Consolidated Edison
Company service representative; a 30-year-old Citibank employee, and a 49-year-old em-
ployee of the Internal Revenue Service. Many are college educated . . . .None of the
prospective jurors. . . had served in Vietnam. One has a son who is an Army staff ser-
geant and another said he "had a personal view against the Vietnam War." Like the other
jurors, however, they said they would not be prejudiced in their consideration of evidence
in the trial.
See also Lacayo, A Theory Goes on Trial, TIME, Sept. 24, 1984, at 62 (describing jury in Shockley
libel case as "five whites and one black"); Jury Awards $395,000 in Death of Demonstrator, St. Pe-
tersburg Times, June 9, 1985, at A13, col. 1 (noting that in two trials "all-white juries acquitted the
Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis on state and federal charges"); Jurors Sworn In For von Bulow Trial,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, § Y, at 10, col. 4 (noting that "[e]leven women and four men were sworn
in yesterday as jurors, three of them as alternates" in the retrial of Claus Von Bulow on charges that
he attempted to murder his wife); Connors, Jury Frees Boy who Killed Abusive Father, Florida
Times-Union, Nov. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 5 (noting that jury in murder case was composed of four
men and two women); Lubasch, Sharon v. Time Trial Begins in Manhattan Federal Court, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1984, § Y, at 15, col. 1 (noting that jury in libel case consisted of four women and
two men); Cyril, Jury Finds Archer Man Guilty in Rape, Robbery, Burglary, U. Fla. Alligator, Oct.
26, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (noting that jury in rape and robbery case was comprised of five men and one
woman); Shipp, Two In Abuse Case Found Not Guilty, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1984, § Y, at 20, col. 1
(noting that jury in sex abuse case was composed of eight men and four women).
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designed to check government power visibly becomes a tool of government
power, and respect for the jury's verdict may diminish, or worse, may change to
contempt.
Implicit in these observations about troublesome juries are several keys to
the proper definition of a peer. First, the examples show that agreement can
probably be reached on which traits are relevant in a particular case. For exam-
ple, most people probably believe that gender defines one's experiences in ways
that are relevant to cases that raise gender-associated issues such as rape or
spouse abuse.256 Thus, a consensus, however inarticulate and subliminal, can be
mustered as to who is whose "peer" in at least some cases. Moreover, such a
consensus is likely to reveal that people do not think of a peer as a "sympa-
thizer." A jury of peers of a battered woman who kills her abusive spouse does
not, in most people's minds, mean a jury of women who have committed similar
acts. Likewise, a jury of "peers" of a defendant accused of theft does not mean a
jury of thieves.
Second, the examples emphasize the significance of public perception about
what experiences and hence what group lines are important in a given case.
That is, whether or not gender in fact would determine one's ability to be an
empathetic juror in a spouse abuse case is largely irrelevant. The keys are
whether the public and the participants can see the characteristic of gender and
whether they believe that gender will affect the nature of the judgment.257 The
reason that their belief, and not reality, is important has already been stated: the
appearance of justice is critical to public acceptance of the jury verdict,258 and
popular notions of fairness determine what appears just.
256. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the jury must include women in a case
in which a woman killed her husband after years of physical and emotional abuse and asserted as her
defense temporary insanity. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1961). The argument of this Arti-
cle is that an all-male jury in such a case is not a jury that includes the defendant's peers; thus, such a
jury would not appear fair to most members of the community.
257. Justice Douglas, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), indicated the view, likely
shared by many, that gender may affect the nature of a judgment:
[I]t is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a
class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who
would claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all men were inten-
tionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are
not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community com-
posed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponder-
ables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of
difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.
Id. at 193-94. Justice Douglas' observations find support in the work of Carol Gilligan, who main-
tains that the moral reasoning of girls and women differs from that of boys and men. C. GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFERENT VoicE (1982). Whether this distinction is explainable by innate differences be-
tween the sexes or by different life experiences is unclear.
258. See, for example, Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093, 3100 (1984), in which Justice
Stevens stated in his dissent:
An established principle of this Court's jurisprudence is that the injury caused by race and
sex discrimination in the formulation of grand and petit juries is measured not only in
terms of the actual prejudice caused to individual defendants but also in terms of the injury
done to public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.
See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 823 (1984) ("The value of [open
trials] lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of
fairness are being observed .... Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal
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This last point assumes that these "popular notions" of justice are discover-
able. Judges have several ways of discovering popular opinions about what a
fair jury should look like. One obvious way is to consult their own experiences
and perceptions. A second means is to review what students learn about the jury
system and about what constitutes a fair jury from traditional textbooks. The
coverage of the subject in conventional textbooks is idealistic, misleading, and
incomplete.259 The impression created by these textbooks is that all citizens are
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."). In Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 398 (1972), Justice Stewart wrote in his dissenting opinion:
[O]nly a unanimous jury. . . can serve to minimize the potential bigotry of those who
might convict on inadequate evidence, or acquit when evidence of guilt was clear...
And community confidence in the administration of criminal justice cannot but be cor-
roded under a system in which a defendant who is conspicuously identified with a particu-
lar group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along group lines.
See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("[E]ven if there is no showing of actual bias in the
tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or
the appearance of bias."); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("But to perform its high
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice.' "); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("A trial jury on which one of the defendant's race has no
chance to sit may not have the substance, and cannot have the appearance, of impartiality, especially
when the accused is a Negro and the alleged victim is not."). Justice Frankfurter stated in his
dissenting opinion in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950), "The appearance of imparti-
ality is an essential manifestation of its reality."
Other examples include Tapia v. Barker, 160 Cal. App. 3d 761, 766, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806
(1984) ("When ajury verdict is so clearly the result of [racial] bias, it cannot stand. It has often been
stated, in varying forms, that not only must our courts render impartial justice, but they must also
appear to do so in order to maintain confidence in our legal system."), and People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d
135, 140-41, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting) ("The majority's continuing sup-
port of [discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges] will erode public confidence in the fairness
and impartiality of our criminal justice system, particularly among the large portion of our popula-
tion who are of the same race as the persons who are the objects of the exclusion.").
259. For example, MAGRUDER'S AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (W. McClenaghan rev. ed. 1977)
includes only two short sections discussing jury selection. "A trial by an impartial jury is guaran-
teed in all federal criminal cases . . . . A State may not exclude anyone from jury service on
grounds of race or color." Id. at 122. This quotation does not make clear that either attorney can
easily exclude a juror based on race or color on a peremptory challenge. Rather, the book states only
that
counsel for the accused and the prosecutor may challenge a certain number, which is lim-
ited by law, without giving any cause, and the judge will excuse such prospective jurors.
The counsel for the accused and the prosecutor may also challenge any prospective juror
for cause; that is, for any reason which indicates the juror may not be impartial-for exam-
ple, for holding a preconceived opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the accused.
Id. at 561. This quotation suggests that both attorneys want an impartial jury and that they would
remove a juror only to prevent a nonimpartial jury.
A slightly more recent textbook at least presents the possibility that jurors might be removed
from service because of racial prejudice against the defendant:
If there is a jury trial, the jury must be impartial. An impartial jury is one that is
neither for nor against the defendant until the members have heard the evidence. For
example, the defendant's lawyers can ask jurors, before the trial, if they are against the
defendant because of his or her race. People who do not appear to be impartial can be kept
off the jury. A jury must also have both men and women on it.
R. GRoss, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE WAY WE GOVERN 159 (1979). Yet, the text also makes
idealistic statements about the goal of an "impartial" jury, and asserts incorrectly that women must
serve on each jury. These teachings could later cause great disillusionment when students first en-
counter a "real" jury selection.
The author has found only one textbook that discusses the reality of racial prejudice in jury
selection:
The Constitution guarantees a trial by an impartial jury, one that has not made up its mind
about a case before the trial begins. Yet fair juries are hard to obtain in some parts of the
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entitled to an impartial jury and that women and minorities are not subject to
exclusion solely on the basis of their gender or race.260 Students are taught to
expect juries to include minorities and women. Thus, an American student
asked to describe a fair jury for Swain, based on textbook readings on juries and
jury selection, is unlikely to respond, "an all-white jury." Rather, the student
would expect a jury of white and black people, men and women, and would be
disappointed, if not shocked, by Swain's conviction by an all-white jury.
A third window to popular notions of fairness in juries is American litera-
ture.26 1 Unlike textbook writers, American novelists and playwrights have not,
by and large, been complimentary toward the jury.262 One commentator ex-
country. In the South, for example, the members of juries have almost always been white
men. Blacks have been kept off. When a black person was charged with a crime against a
white person, the members of these juries were often prejudiced against the defendant.
M. FINKELSTEIN, J. SANDIFER & E. WRIGHT, MINORITIES: U.S.A. 130 (1971). This book also was
the only textbook which suggested that a fairer trial could be obtained if blacks served on more
juries. Id. at 192. However, as its title indicates, the book's focus is on minorities and problems
special to minorities, unlike the other general textbooks cited.
Because of the textbooks' inadequacies, most school systems have tended to turn to other
sources in order to teach students about juries. Gainesville High School is located in a relatively
small city in Florida. Its Director of Social Studies, Lu LaFontaine, stated that her program teaches
students through the use of "flexible materials"-paperback novels such as A. LEwIS, GIDEON'S
TRUMPET (1964) and speakers such as judges and attorneys in the classroom. She also takes her
students each year to observe a real jury selection. Interview with Lu LaFontaine, Director of Social
Studies Department, Gainesville High School, Gainesville, Florida (Apr. 19, 1985). She believes
these tools are "honest" and provide students with the ability to obtain a realistic, rather than an
idealistic impression of our jury selection process. Id. She has also served on a jury several times
and relates her experiences to her students, always with the reminder that one never will fully under-
stand the jury process until one serves as a juror. Her encouragement to serve on a jury and her own
service on several juries gives her students the positive message that our jury system can work but
that, at the same time, one must see it realistically to correct flaws and maintain its fairness.
Student participation in courtroom field trips is more limited in a big city, such as Washington,
D.C. Dr. Francis Powell, Supervising Director of History and Social Studies for the District of
Columbia, stated that coordinating trips to watch court trials is unwieldy with a large number of
students. Interview with Dr. Francis Powell (May 8, 1985). However, an optional course called
"Street Law" is provided in eleventh grade to take the place of field trips. The course, taught by
Georgetown University law students, allows eleventh graders to play all the roles in a mock jury trial
that is performed at the end of the school year. One facet of the course enables students to experi-
ence jury selection first hand as they alternately play the roles of prospective jurors and attorneys.
Id. In addition, a required Federal Government course is taught in twelfth grade. Lawyers speak in
the classroom and the local bar organization also sponsors programs in the schools. Id. Thus, while
the program, of necessity, is slightly different in a large city, the main thrust still is to provide
students with a positive perception that our jury system can work and can produce fair results.
260. See supra note 259.
261. John Henry Wigmore made a similar point in 1922 by urging lawyers to read legal novels.
Wigmore, A List of One Hundred Legal Novels, 17 ILL. L. REv. 26 (1922). He stated that the lawyer
has a "professional duty to be familiar with those features of his profession which have been taken up
into general thought and literature." Id. at 28. Legal novels enable lawyers to acquire a deeper sense
of the reality of how the law operates-"to realize the operation of the old rules now gone-to feel
their meaning in human life and to appreciate the bitter conflicts and their lessons for today." Id. at
29.
262. See Watts, From American Literature, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA, supra note 59, at
161. Watts describes the jury in American literature as follows:
The jury in American literature has generally represented this "alien tribe" or group
of "Odd Fellows," with the accused "plain old Adam, the simple genuine self." The "alien
tribe" of jurors is, at least according to authors of American literature, unable to perform
its function as impartial truth-finder for a variety of reasons. . . . [T]he impartiality of
jurors has been compromised by personal, racial, regional, family, or political prejudices,
by weakness of will or by ignorance, by the manipulation of judges, lawyers, or witnesses,
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plains that the literature that features the jury depicts the jury "as a symbol or
metaphor for the organized forces of organized society (or history) against
which the protagonist must struggle. '263 Accordingly, the problems these writ-
ers perceive with the jury are the problems of larger society and its often callous
disregard for the individual, particularly for the culturally or otherwise different
individual. Not surprisingly, many novels and plays that "discuss" or "focus
on" the jury underscore the problems of prejudiced,264 ignorant, 26 5 or inflam-
mable266 jurors.
One lesson to be learned from literature that depicts the jury is that nonlaw-
yer writers are deeply disturbed by the unfair treatment of the "different" de-
by jury tampering, even by fatalistic forces of history or by the blundering of a God. When
the jury has rendered a correct or merciful decision, the judgment is based on the wrong
reasons.
Id. at 175-76.
263. Id. at 175.
264. See, eg., J. COOPER, THE WAYS OF THE HOUR (1861); J. COZZENS, THE JUST AND THE
UNJUST (1942); H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Popular Library ed. 1960); R. ROSE, Twelve
Angry Men, in Six TELEVISION PLAYS (1956); B. STAViS, THE MAN WHO NEVER DIED-A PLAY
ABOUT JOE HILL (1972); R. WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (Harper Bros. ed. 1940); Moore, supra note 225.
Perhaps the most eloquent of these expressions about prejudiced jurors is Harper Lee's To KILL
A MOCKINGBIRD, in which a black man is wrongly convicted of raping a white woman. In the
following passage Atticus Finch, the lawyer who defended the accused, attempts to explain to his
son Jem how such injustices come to pass:
This was not good enough for Jem. "No sir, they oughta do away with juries. He
wasn't guilty in the first place and they said he was."
"If you had been on that jury, son, and eleven other boys like you, Tom would be a
free man," said Atticus. "So far nothing in your life has interfered with your reasoning
process. Those are twelve reasonable men in everyday life, Tom's jury, but you saw some-
thing come between them and reason. . . . There's something in our world that makes
men lose their heads-they couldn't be fair if they tried. In our courts, when it's a white
man's word against a black man's, the white man always wins. They're ugly, but those are
the facts of life."
"Doesn't make it right," said Jem stolidly. He beat his fist softly on his knee. "You
just can't convict a man on evidence like that-you can't."
"You couldn't, but they could and did. The older you grow the more of it you'll see.
The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is in a courtroom, be lie any color of
the rainbow, but people have a way of carrying their resentments right into a jury box."
H. LEE, supra, at 245.
265. See, eg., M. TWAIN, ROUGHING IT (U. Cal. Press ed. 1972). Twain indicted the jury in the
following oft-quoted passage:
Trial by jury is the palladium of our liberties. I do not know what a palladium is,
having never seen a palladium, but it is a good thing no doubt at any rate. Not less than a
hundred men have been murdered in Nevada-perhaps I would be within bounds if I said
three hundred-and as far as I can learn, only two persons have suffered the death penalty
there. However, four or five who had no money and no political influence have been pun-
ished by imprisonment-one languished in prison as much as eight months, I think. How-
ever, I do not desire to be extravagant-it may have been less.
Id. at 316-17. Another passage, equally critical, points out Twain's low regard for the jury's
intelligence:
In this age, when a gentlemen of high social standing, intelligence and probity, swears that
testimony given under solemn oath will outweigh, with him, street talk and newspaper
reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their
own ignorance and stupidity, and justice would be far safer in his hands than in theirs.
Id. at 309.
266. See, eg., T. DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1926); W. FAULKNER, SANCTUARY
(1931).
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fendant. The authors' biting indictments of juries that fail to conform to their
expectations about fairness betray their deep admiration for the ideal jury.
Thus, American literature conveys both frustration and hope, pessimism and
idealism, about the jury as an institution and about the ability of society in gen-
eral to treat the individual with dignity, compassion, and fairess.267 It is per-
haps not an overstatement to suggest that all courtroom observers experience
these same conflicting hopes and fears each time twelve laypeople file into a jury
box to hear the facts of a criminal case.
The general apprehension that a jury may not treat the individual fairly
becomes pointed and palpable when an all-white jury tries a black defendant for
the rape of a white woman. These facts have been used by several authors268 as
the backdrop for powerful and sobering statements about human prejudice and
bigotry. As Harper Lee's Atticus Finch sadly observes in To Kill a Mocking-
bird, "In our courts, when it's a white man's word against a black man's the
white man always wins. They're ugly but those are the facts of life."
269
Those ugly facts continue to disturb modern writers such as playwright
Elvie A. Moore. In her Absurdist play, Angela is Happening, Moore protests the
injustice of white judgments against black defendants. The play's all-white jury
intones to the black defendant, "Guilty. . . guilty. . . . Our peers found you
GUILTY." 270
Richard Wright expressed a similar cynical view in Native Son. In Wright's
novel, Bigger, a black man, has killed a white woman; he did not rape her.
When his lawyer asks Bigger whether he raped the woman, Bigger responds,
"Naw. But everybody'll say I did. What's the use? I'm black. They say black
men do that. So it don't matter if I did or if I didn't."
271
Given these popular perceptions about the unfairness of white juries toward
black defendants, the Supreme Court's assertion that the state's challenges in
Swain preserved "the appearance of justice" appears to be either naive or insin-
cere. Either way, the assertion is incorrect. American authors articulate a com-
monly felt sentiment when they suggest that white jurors are not a black
267. Professor Carl Smith describes the stance that writers have taken toward the law as follows:
American writers have spoken most eloquently about the law on those occasions when they
have believed that the justice offered by the American legal system has indeed become
false. Their relationship with the law has often-though certainly not always-been an
adversarial one. Many writers who by common judgment have defined the American liter-
ary tradition have perceived a conflict between their own sense of law and justice and that
which they have seen prevail in their time. They have spoken not as isolated individuals
but as defenders of American moral and ethical idealism, which they think has been be-
trayed by the legal system, and they have presented their own work to balance and
counteract the more dangerous "fictions" of the law. Depending on the occasion, they
have attacked the legal system in and of itself and as an emblem of larger wrongs in Ameri-
can society that the law reflects.
Smith, Law as Form and Theme in American Letters: An Essay in Law and American Literature, in
C. SMITH, J. MCWILLIAMS & M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 85, at 19.
268. See, ag., W. FAULKNER, supra note 266; H. LEE, supra note 264; R. WRIGHT, supra note
264.
269. H. LEE, supra note 264, at 223.
270. Moore, supra note 225, at 174 (emphasis added).
271. R. WRIGHT, supra note 264, at 296.
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defendant's "peers," particularly in the context of an interracial rape case. They
also imply a common belief that peers are essential to a fair jury and that a fair
jury represents important interests that should not be defeated by perversion of
that ideal.
A legal procedure that so distracts observers that they disregard the facts of
the case altogether and begin to suspect, without more, that the outcome is un-
fair, is a perverse procedure. The prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
produce a jury that is seemingly partial to the government and that does not
include any of the defendant's peers is a perverse procedure. The Swain ruling
protects this procedure from meaningful control and compromises several of the
interests the jury right exists to protect. The all-white jury in Swain, for exam-
ple, did not appear to provide a safeguard against a corrupt or overzealous pros-
ecutor. It did not represent multiple voices or appear to produce a diffused
impartiality. It did not correspond with popular expectations of what a fair
criminal jury looks like.
B. A Proposed Procedure
What procedure for jury selection would best accommodate the key terms
and values of the sixth amendment? None can accommodate all interests, and all
proposed changes entail costs.
The proposal that is the easiest to adopt and to administer is to abolish the
peremptory challenge privilege of the prosecution. This option, at the least,
would thwart attempts by the state to defeat the defendant's effort to secure a
panel that includes some peers. It will not guarantee that peers will make their
way to every petit jury; consequently, jury trials will continue to take place when
the jury is all-white or otherwise appears unfair to courtroom observers or to the
defendant.272
Abolishing the state's peremptory would offend no constitutional interest,
as neither the state nor the defendant has a "constitutional" right to peremptory
challenges. 273 Nor would it compromise unduly any state or community inter-
est in an impartial jury; challenges for cause would still be available to the prose-
cution. The jury would, on occasion, still appear unfair to the state's case-as
when an all-white jury acquits a white defendant of a crime against a black
victim. This result, however, would not be caused by abolition of the state's
peremptory, nor would it be produced more often because of its abolition. The
all-white jury that acquits unfairly would be produced by the defendant's exer-
cise of peremptories, coupled with the low number of minorities in the jury pool.
272. The only sure way to obtain a panel with peers in every case would be to adopt a method of
juror selection based explicitly on race, gender, or other group lines. This alternative may be histori-
cally defensible given the past practice of empanelling juries composed in half of aliens, but it is not
now politically plausible. Moreover, this alternative is administratively complicated, as it probably
would involve defining who is whose peer according to an objective, predetermined standard. Given
the vast range of possible factual circumstances and the fact that deciding who is whose peer depends
on the facts of each case, the prospect of defining peers in advance of an actual case is daunting.
273. See supra note 122-23 and accompanying text.
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The correct response to this problem is to assure that the jury pool does not
exclude minorities.
This proposal does not advocate abolition of the defendant's right to chal-
lenge peremptorily, despite the problem of the all-white jury that acquits, be-
cause the defendant's regard of the jury is simply more important than is the
state's. The state has repeated opportunities to enforce the penal code and hence
to protect society; the defendant has only one day in court to protect his or her
interests. The state argues on behalf of the public interest, which generally can
be adequately served by favorable results over time as opposed to a favorable
result in a particular case. If the state loses, it does not lose its liberty, as the
defendant does if he or she loses. Moreover, the peremptory is a crude and
uncertain device; it is extremely unlikely that prosecutors will be significantly
handicapped or that unfair acquittals will increase without it. When it is not
abused, the peremptory serves only to make the parties more confident that the
jury is not opposed to them. In the context of a criminal trial, the potential and
actual disadvantages of the state's peremptory outweigh its putative advantages.
A principle of American criminal procedure is that it is better for a guilty person
to go free than for an innocent one to be convicted. Correlatively, it is better to
preserve the appearance of fairness to the defendant and possibly to compromise
the appearance of empathy with the government than to exalt a nonconstitu-
tional and dubious state interest in peremptories over the defendant's interest in
a judgment by peers. The simplest, most economic, and most sensible way to
preserve the appearance of fairness is to abolish the state's peremptory.
Other alternatives to Swain have been suggested by some federal and state
courts. The most significant of these recent suggestions comes from the opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in McCray v.
Abrams.274 The opinion set forth a new test for the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. To establish a prima facie case that the prosecution has used peremptory
challenges in violation of the sixth amendment, the defendant must show (1)
that the group allegedly excluded is a "cognizable group in the community," and
(2) that a substantial likelihood exists that the challenges were made on the basis
of the prospective juror's group affiliation and not because of that juror's inabil-
274. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). The court in McCray held that although a defendant has no
right to a petit jury of a particular composition, the sixth amendment still is implicated at this stage
of the jury selection process, as it is at the earlier stage of creating jury pools. Id. at 1128.
Judge Kearse wrote the majority opinion, an in-depth treatment of the Supreme Court's jury
decisions. She read the Supreme Court's precedent as supporting the view that the sixth amendment
guarantees a defendant "the possibility of a cross-sectional petit jury." Id. at 1129. She found sup-
port for this proposition in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237 (1978), which held that five-person
juries were unconstitutional, and in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968), which held
that the state could not challenge for cause all people who oppose the death penalty. In both cases
the venire was properly constituted; the issue was whether the selection of the petit jury was consti-
tutional. Judge Kearse was persuaded by the argument that the sixth amendment protects the right
of each defendant to an impartial jury, not only the last defendant in a long sequence of discrimina-
tory acts. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130; see also McCray v. New York, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438,
2442 (1983) (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) ("The systematic exclusion of prospective ju-
rors because of their race is. . . unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection process."). Judge
Kearse noted that because the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right, when its exercise
conflicts with the defendant's sixth amendment rights, "it is the inscrutability of the peremptory
challenge that must yield, not the constitutional right." McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130.
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ity to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented. 275 The burden then
shifts to the government to show that "'permissible racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic results.' ",276 The
government is not required to show a "cause" reason for a challenge, but it must
offer a "genuine" reason to believe that a prospective juror may have a "slight
bias," which although insufficient for a cause challenge is enough to make ex-
cusal desirable.277 When the prosecutor fails to satisfy the judge that his or her
reasons for excusing a juror are genuine, "the court should declare a mistrial,
and a new jury should be selected from a new panel." '278
275. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1131-32.
276. Id. at 1132 (quoting a series of equal protection cases that quote Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
277. Id.
278. Id. Lower courts in the Second Circuit have disagreed on how to apply McCray. One
question troubling the district courts is whether McCray applies only to the exclusion of cognizable
groups or whether the ruling extends to the exclusion of whites. See Roman v. Abrams, 608 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Schreiber v. Salamack, 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2105 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
6, 1985). The Fifth Circuit has adopted a more limited approach to preventing the discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges. In United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1985), the court
invoked its supervisory power over the federal district courts to correct what it viewed as a process
that compromised the integrity of the judicial process. The court did not disallow racial considera-
tions in every case, but limited its holding to the facts presented. The standard it adopted is general
and vague. It requires the district judge to inquire, on timely objection by the defendant, whether
the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges for unjustifiable, racially discriminatory reasons.
Neither the Second Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit discussed whether their new standards will
apply to peremptory challenges by the defendant. The implication of the decisions is that they apply
only to challenges by the prosecution, as they rely on the defendant's constitutional right and the
integrity of the judicial process. Both bases suggest that it is government action that must conform
to the stated standards, not the actions of private individnals.
The genesis of the recent federal court movement toward closer scrutiny of the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges lies in the 1978 California Supreme Court decision, People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). Relying on its state constitution, the Califor-
nia court held that peremptory challenges may not be exercised by either party on the sole ground of
group bias, as opposed to specific bias. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The
reason for this rule was that such challenges compromise the defendant's right to a representative
jury. The defendant, however, is constitutionally entitled to a "petit jury that is as near an approxi-
mation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits." Id. at
277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
The California court described the purpose of the cross-section requirement as the only practi-
cal means of achieving overall impartiality in the jury. Id. at 270, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
898. It assumed that all jurors possess opinions, preconceptions, or even biases that derive from
their life experiences. By involving a variety of people of different backgrounds in the jury process,
these various biases may cancel each other. Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
The court conceded the importance of cause and peremptory challenges to the excusal of prospective
jurors whose biases are directed toward the particular case on trial, the parties, or the witnesses.
Elimination of this "specific bias," however, is, according to the court, the only valid basis for a
challenge. Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. A party cannot exercise a challenge
because the party assumes that certain veniremembers may be biased simply because they belong to
an identifiable group, whether it is a racial, religious, ethnic, or other similar group. In the court's
view, challenges exercised on the basis of group affiliation make impossible the interaction of diverse
beliefs necessary to achieve overall impartiality. The result is a jury "dominated by the conscious or
unconscious prejudices of the majority." Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
The remedy the California court proposed essentially presaged the remedy adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in McCray. The California court established a presumption that a party will exercise
peremptories for a valid reason. The presumption is rebuttable, upon timely objection by counsel, by
a showing that the persons excluded belong to a "cognizable group" and that a "strong likelihood"
exists that they were challenged on the basis of their group affiliation and not because of suspected
specific bias. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 763-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The trial court determines
whether this prima facie case has been established. If it has, the burden shifts to the opponent to
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The administrative costs of this approach and the risk that the state will
mask its true motives by producing plausible explanations for excluding minori-
ties are not worth incurring unless they are outweighed by the value of the pros-
ecution's peremptory. This Article concludes that the prosecution's peremptory
is not so valuable as to outweigh the risks and costs of an alternative approach
and recommends that the peremptory be abolished. This solution is an histori-
cally defensible, constitutionally acceptable, workable solution to an aggravating
and persistent problem.279 It is not the whole solution, but it is a fair beginning
to preserving the values that underlie the sixth amendment.
VI. AN AFTERWORD
This Article proceeds on the premise that the sixth amendment represents a
valuable right that should be clarified and protected. It argues for revitalization
of the term "peers" in a way that corresponds to changes that have occurred in
our society but not in human nature. People always have and doubtless always
will respond more openly, compassionately, and understandingly to those like
themselves than to those who are different. This human trait, like so many
human characteristics and frailties, permeates the way people judge one another;
indeed, awareness of this trait is one reason to preserve the jury option.
This Article does not suggest that judgments will become "fair" or that
show that the challenge was not based only on group bias. Id. at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 906. This showing need not be sufficient for a cause challenge; the party need only justify
the challenge on grounds that are reasonably relevant to the particular case, Le, a specific bias. Id.
at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
279. The reported decisions represent only a handful of the possible alternatives to the approach
in Swain. Commentators have proposed numerous other solutions, based on a range of legal theo-
ries. An incomplete list of the proposed approaches is as follows: (1) to limit the number of per-
emptories available to the government, see, eg., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 14, at 375-77;
Comment, People v. Wheeler: Has California Really Assured Impartial Juries by Revision of Per-
emptory Challenges?, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 527, 542; (2) to develop a special rule limiting perempto-
ries only in trials involving racial issues, see, eg., Comment, Prosecutorial Misuses of the Peremptory
Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups From the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v. Soares, 21 B.C.L.
REV. 1197, 1220 (1980); (3) to impanel a "mixed jury" not unlike the jury de medietate linguae, see,
e.g., Potash, supra note 96, at 95; Note, The Case For Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548-49 (1970);
(4) to require a jury composed totally of peers, eg., an all black jury for a black defendant, A.
GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 10.13, at 472-73 (1975); and (5) in order to
assure cross-representative jury pools, to allow people to be excused from jury duty only in excep-
tional cases, and then to empanel the first 12 people who do not have actual blood or friendship ties
with a litigant, see, eg., Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted to Ensure That Our
Juries are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 67 (1976).
The legal theories that have been offered as bases for regulating peremptory challenges include
the constitutional theories of equal protection, due process, and the right to an impartial jury, see
supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text, the statutory theory of the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274 § 101, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1970)), the
administrative power theory in federal court that the higher courts have supervisory power to regu-
late procedure in the lower courts in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, see, eg.,
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946); Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-87 (1942);
the "officer to the court" theory that the government prosecutor has an obligation only to secure a
fair verdict and not a conviction at the cost of court integrity or essential fairness, see, eg., Younger,
supra note 14, at 55; and a state law-federal law theory that the federal courts should allow the states
to fashion their own rules in this sensitive area, incorporating through the fourteenth amendment
only skeletal, basic features of the jury that would not cover the peremptory challenge practices, see,
e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
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abusive government power will be substantially curtailed simply by the place-
ment of a "peer" or two more into the jury box. Although these results might
occur, it is possible that a peer will be swayed by other nonpeers on the jury or
will be psychologically unable to overcome conditioning that makes him or her
wrongly believe that some races, women, or members of any other group, in-
cluding his or her own, are inferior or are prone to certain behavior. Also, even
a jury that includes peers may have little impact on government power; as Toc-
queville has argued, the jury is but a small amount of lay input that preserves a
large amount of government power.280
A token peer or two may not change the way a jury rules. That peer or
two, however, might affect the jury's dialogue during deliberations, the impres-
sions the jury has of the evidence, and the jury's awareness of factors outside the
individual jurors' experiences. The chance that these results might occur is not
negligible and is worth protecting; changes in behavior may follow changes in
the appearance of the jury.
The message that the existence of an "impartial jury" in the whole sense of
that term conveys to the community may not always be an accurate portrayal of
the fairness of the verdict that jury renders. But the alternative, to continue to
empanel juries that exclude defendants' peers and defeat defendants' belief in the
chances for fair hearings, could lead society to reject the verdicts or become
resigned to unfairness.
For these reasons, and because it is consistent with the spirit of the sixth
amendment, the jury right should continue to include the right to a jury of the
defendant's "peers." Abolition of the state's peremptory challenge is a very
small step toward this end; far more drastic steps are historically defensible and
would better preserve the defendant's interests. 281 The mood of the Supreme
Court, however, seems to be to reject reform designed to increase significantly
the protections of criminal defendants' rights. Accordingly, this Article pro-
poses only a modest change that may prove acceptable to the current Court,
leaving more radical proposals for a more propitious time.
280. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 75, at 128.
281. See supra note 272.
ADDENDUM
While this Article was in the final publication stages, the United States Supreme Court decided
Batson v. Kentucky, 46 S. Cr. BULL. P. B2022 (CCH) (Apr. 30, 1986) (No. 84-6263). The Court
held that the same equal protection principles that govern the selection of the venire govern the
State's use of peremptory challenges to strike individual jurors from the petit jury. Id. at B2029-30.
Thus, the prosecutor may not "challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against
a black defendant." Id. at B2030. Further, the Court held that "a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." Id. at B2036-37. The Court
expressly overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), to the extent that it conflicts with the
principles announced in Batson. Id. at B2041 n.25. Disappointingly, the Court expressed "no views
on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense
counsel." Id. at B2029 n.12. Nor did the Court address the merits of petitioner's sixth amendment
arguments. Id. at B2025 n.4. Thus, the sixth amendment principles discussed in this Article may
form the basis for future development of the principles announced in Batson.
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